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Anti-Nuclear Struggle Offers New Opportunities
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[Article by G.M. Korniyenko: "New Phase of Antinuclear Struggle; New Opportunities and New Objectives"]

[Text] The events of the last 2 years allow us to say with complete certainty that the struggle to prevent nuclear war and to eliminate the nuclear threat altogether has entered a qualitatively new phase.

The Soviet Union's course of action based on a new way of thinking has been of decisive significance in this. Sufficient proof of this is provided by a list of the following milestones along this 2-year stretch of the road.

6 August 1985—On the day when the world bowed its head for the 40th time in memory of the victims of the Hiroshima tragedy, the Soviet Union tried to provide the momentum to stop the destructive competition in the accumulation and improvement of nuclear arsenals by suspending all nuclear tests unilaterally and asking the United States to follow its example. For more than a year and a half silence reigned on the Soviet testing grounds. And although Washington's stubborn refusal to stop testing nuclear weapons put an end to the Soviet moratorium, it was useful because it provided strong impetus for louder demands throughout the world for the cessation of nuclear tests.

November 1985—In a joint statement on the results of the Geneva meeting, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev and President of the United States R. Reagan declared that "nuclear war must never be started, there can be no winners in it." Although the United States' subsequent behavior could not fail to raise questions about the sincerity with which the American leader signed the statement, the document stimulated and signalled the further growth of the movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons, including the movement in the United States.

15 January 1986—This date can certainly be called a red-letter day in the history of the struggle to save humanity from annihilation. A program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons throughout the world by the year 2000 was set forth in the statement by M.S. Gorbachev published on that day.

March 1986—The 27th CPSU Congress decreed that USSR foreign policy focus on the implementation of the program set forth in the statement of 15 January 1986.

October 1986—A Soviet-American summit meeting was held in Reykjavik and was described by M.S. Gorbachev as the moment of truth "when the magnificent prospect of embarking on the road to a nuclear-free world was unveiled."

What specific changes occurred as a result of all this and what are the specific grounds for describing the current stage of the struggle against the nuclear threat as a qualitatively new phase?

First of all, there is ample proof that the number of people in the world who realize the dimensions and reality of the nuclear threat, to the point of mankind's self-annihilation unless the arms race is stopped and reversed, has risen dramatically in the last 2 years and could even be said to have risen in a geometric progression.

One important factor contributing to public awareness of the nuclear threat is the increasing number of physicians, physicists, and other scientists in the antinuclear movement, scientists whose professional knowledge allows them to speak of the nuclear danger in detail and to back up their statements with facts and proof—this is always more convincing than the most accurate but general phrases.

The great tragedy that occurred in the Soviet Union also served the cause. This is the nature of dialectics. After the accident in Chernobyl everyone gained a much greater awareness and understanding of the danger of the use of nuclear weapons, in view of the fact that even the malfunctioning of a single atomic reactor caused so much grief and damage.

Mankind's increasing awareness of the dimensions and reality of the nuclear danger is also attested to by the fact that the very term "nuclear-free world," as a goal worth fighting for, has become an established part of political terminology in the last 2 years.

In the second place, there is also reason to speak of a qualitatively new phase of the antinuclear struggle because the complete elimination of nuclear weapons was once discussed in general terms, as a final goal to be reached at some indefinite time in the future, but now a specific and detailed plan of action has been proposed for the attainment of this goal within a short period of time—before the end of this century. When the plan was set forth in M.S. Gorbachev's statement of 15 January 1986, the issue of the elimination of nuclear weapons moved, so to speak, from the theoretical plane to the plane of reality. It mobilized broad strata, including previously uncommitted ones, of the world public to strive for the prevention of nuclear war and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In the third place, the Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik played a special and truly historic role in the rise of the struggle against the nuclear threat to a qualitatively new level. And it did this in spite of the impossibility of reaching any kind of final and specific agreements there.

It might seem paradoxical to some people, at least on the surface, by the standards of formal logic, to speak of a meeting of historic importance which led to no agreements. If we approach the matter from the vantage point of Marxist, dialectical logic, however, there is nothing paradoxical here, and it is completely understandable that when M.S. Gorbachev spoke of Reykjavik, he said that "it was not a failure, but a breakthrough."

When people learned how close the sides were to reaching radical agreements, they first saw and believed in the real possibility of stopping the slide toward the nuclear abyss, of reversing direction, and of getting rid of nuclear weapons—completely, everywhere, and forever—in the near future. And now that the door to a nuclear-free world was opened in Reykjavik—even if only slightly and only for a short time—people will never allow it to be bricked up again.

Therefore, whereas it was just recently common opinion that the elimination of nuclear weapons is a desirable but utopian goal, now people are certain that a nuclear-free world is a realistic goal, however difficult the journey to it might be. And this certainty that the goal is attainable is a great force in itself.

Another indication that Reykjavik was productive rather than unproductive in putting the issue of the elimination of nuclear weapons on the plane of reality is the vehement criticism of Reykjavik by the people who are hanging on to nuclear weapons and cannot even conceive of giving them up. It is a fact, after all, that many Western officials who had previously tried to portray themselves as supporters of the elimination of nuclear weapons had to throw off their masks after Reykjavik and openly oppose their elimination. This self-exposure by the devotees of nuclear weapons might also serve the cause: It is important for people to know exactly who wants to hang on to the nuclear weapons and who should therefore be the target of stronger pressure.

The new phase of the struggle to prevent nuclear war and eliminate nuclear weapons will be a time of new and broad opportunities and also of new demands. Statements against nuclear weapons and in favor of their prohibition and elimination must be more specific and more persuasive, and great care must be taken to clearly reveal the falsity and groundlessness of the arguments of the opponents of nuclear disarmament.

Their favorite argument is the allegation that the existence of nuclear weapons is the reason for the absence of a "big war" in the world in more than 40 years, whereas conventional arms, according to this argument, could not prevent two world wars.

But in the first place, no one has proved or can prove that a third world war would have broken out if there had been no nuclear weapons. It is more logical to assume that if the United States had not created the atomic bomb, which went to some people's heads in the United States and was followed by the appearance of nuclear weapons in other nations, there would have been more chance of implementing the provisions of the UN Charter regarding the creation of a system of common security and peace would be much less tenuous than it is today.

In the second place, the fact that conventional arms did not prevent two world wars simply confirms the fact that any kind of arms race can start a war instead of deterring it. The mere existence of weapons, however dangerous they might be, is not enough to prevent a war. This can and must be done by people.

In the third place, when the Soviet Union proposes concerted effort to build a nuclear-free world, it does not mean a return to the situation preceding the two world wars. In a world without nuclear weapons there will have to be strong political and legal mechanisms to regulate international relations and guarantee international security with a minimum of arms, the number and composition of which will be dictated by purely defensive needs.

In the fourth place—and this is the main consideration—although no third world war has broken out yet, no one can guarantee that it will not break out in the future and that nuclear weapons will not be used. It is no secret that the official NATO military doctrine does not exclude the possibility of their use. And the most the theorists of "nuclear deterrence" can promise is that it is "unlikely" or "almost inconceivable" that nuclear weapons will be used. But can the human mind and heart accept even the slightest (although it is actually far from slight) possibility of mankind's self-annihilation?

Another faulty argument alleges that it is impossible to get rid of nuclear weapons because the technology of their production cannot be erased from human memory. In completely identical circumstances this argument did not interfere with the conclusion of the international convention outlawing bacteriological weapons and it is not interfering with the negotiation of a convention on the total prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

In short, both arguments—the one about the beneficial, stabilizing role of nuclear weapons and the one about the impossibility in principle of getting rid of them—are groundless. Any theory which questions the necessity and possibility of banning and eliminating nuclear weapons as quickly as possible and postpones these objectives indefinitely goes against the reason and wishes of humanity, which is striving to rid itself of the danger of nuclear war.

Along with the exposure of such theories, opposition to the American Star Wars program is an important and crucial part of the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons. The special importance of this part of the struggle is due to the dangerous implications of the deployment of a space-based ABM system and to the fact that the American administration is presenting this program to its own people and others as the only possible way of reaching a nuclear-free world. In this way, the elimination of nuclear weapons—even on the level of theory—is being postponed until after space-based ABM systems have been created and—on the level of reality—is being abandoned as an impossible objective because the emplacement of weapons in space would escalate the nuclear arms race even more.

This is why all those who are striving for the elimination of nuclear weapons must realize that the attainment of this goal will depend largely on the success in preventing the militarization of space and in preserving and reinforcing the ABM treaty. In other words, the struggle against the SDI program is simultaneously a struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons.

There is also another part of the struggle to eliminate nuclear weapons. This aspect is concerned with chemical weapons and conventional arms. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have always favored a ban on chemical weapons and the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces, but now they are taking additional, far-reaching steps in these areas in view of their direct significance and of the fact that this should facilitate the resolution of the nuclear problem by alleviating the worries, however unfounded they might be, of some people in the West that the elimination of nuclear weapons will make the West weaker than the East.

It would be best to conclude with a brief discussion of two issues on which the fighters against nuclear weapons sometimes have different opinions.

The first is the issue of the combination of general and particular elements in the antinuclear struggle. In other words, should the struggle focus immediately on an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons completely or on partial and seemingly more realistic measures to limit and reduce these weapons?

It is unlikely that anyone who is striving for a nuclear-free world would not prefer the immediate conclusion of a general agreement on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the subsequent negotiation and implementation of practical steps in this direction. This is the approach specified in the Soviet program of 15 January 1986, but the Soviet Union has never adhered and will never adhere to the principle of "all or nothing" in this matter.

Some people make the completely accurate statement that the nuclear arms race has continued in the quantitative and qualitative respects despite all of the agreements concluded to date. This, however, does not provide the slightest basis for any doubts that without all of these agreements—on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the prohibition of nuclear tests in the three spheres, the ABM treaty, SALT-I, SALT-II, and several others—the dimensions of the arms race would be incomparably larger and the situation today would most certainly be much worse or even irreversible. For this reason, those who believe that it would have been better not to have these agreements, that they supposedly only detracted from the struggle for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, are essentially saying: "The worse, the better."

It would be even more against common sense to miss an opportunity to conclude a partial agreement which would lead to the removal of whole categories of nuclear arms from the U.S. and USSR nuclear arsenals, such as intermediate-range and operational-tactical missiles, allegedly in the interests of the struggle for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Of course, while we are doing everything within our power to carry out partial measures in the sphere of nuclear disarmament as quickly as possible, it is equally important to continue the efforts to completely prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons as such. As all peace-loving forces exert stronger pressure on the devotees of nuclear weapons for their complete elimination, this pressure will provide stronger momentum for the advancement of partial measures.

Furthermore, on the level of diplomacy and negotiation, the balance between general and particular can be different at different stages, and the reasons for this would seem to be obvious. If, for instance, priority in the current Soviet-American talks were to be assigned to the complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby relegating other, partial, but important and easily resolved issues to a position of secondary importance, the people on the other side of the table would be only too happy to launch into an endless discussion of a general nature about the good and bad points of nuclear weapons and thereby avoid the conclusion of agreements on partial measures that would represent steps toward the complete elimination of these weapons.

The second issue, which also arises sometimes, concerns the connection between antinuclear and anti-imperialist struggle.

Because imperialism, especially American imperialism, is a source of military danger, including the danger of nuclear war, it is understandable that the antinuclear struggle is simultaneously directed objectively against imperialism as such. But namely objectively, and this is not the main part of the struggle to prevent nuclear war and completely eliminate nuclear weapons.

If, as Marxist-Leninist doctrine says, the interests of society in general are higher than the interests of any particular class, this is triply true when it is a matter of the interests of humanity at large—and, in this case, the very survival of the human race. As M.S. Gorbachev stressed, "the objective of survival stands above all conflicts, all disagreements and differences of opinion between states and social movements, above the interests of various groups of people. This conclusion lies at the basis of the new way of political thinking."¹

The front of the struggle against the nuclear threat and for the elimination of nuclear weapons must be and is incomparably broader than the front of struggle against imperialism. One vivid example of this is the composition of the participants of the international forum "For a Nuclear-Free World and for the Survival of Humanity" in Moscow in February 1987.

Otherwise, it would be simply unrealistic to expect the antinuclear struggle to succeed in the near future. The delivery of humanity from the threat of nuclear annihilation can be accomplished only through vigorous efforts by all peace-loving, democratic forces on the broadest possible basis, regardless of political, ideological, religious, and other differences. Even an imperialist who thinks rationally will not want to burn in the nuclear holocaust along with the communists, and he should also contribute to the common struggle against the nuclear threat.

But it is only natural that it is precisely the communist and other workers parties, the USSR and other socialist countries, that are leading the struggle against the nuclear threat and for nuclear disarmament.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA, 3 June 1987.

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Strategic Stability Tied to Nuclear Weapons: Part II

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[Second Installment of article by A.G. Arbatov, A.A. Vasilyev, and A.A. Kokoshin: "Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability"]

[Text] Many political and military officials in the Western countries virtually reduce the entire problem of strategic stability to the vulnerability of the land-based component of strategic nuclear forces to strikes by intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV'ed ICBM's). They

maintain that these weapons are capable, by virtue of high accuracy and sufficient force, to destroy such super-hardened targets as missile silos. They say that the simultaneous launching of missiles with a short flight time at hundreds of targets can be accomplished only with land-based missiles because of the superiority of their command and communications system and the distinctive features of their basing method.

Some American experts have raised the issue of the increasing vulnerability of ICBM's and other stationary targets on both sides. At the same time, some American officials are alleging that this problem only exists on the American side because the Soviet strategic arsenal contains many heavy MIRV'ed ICBM's. This is why the so-called "window of vulnerability" supposedly appeared in U.S. strategic forces.

This issue has played a significant role in the analysis of various aspects of the stability of the military-strategic balance. It must be said, however, that the factors and parameters of strategic stability can never be confined to the mere vulnerability of MIRV'ed ICBM silos.

First of all, it is completely false that the problem of vulnerability exists only for American strategic forces. The fact is that all ICBM's became vulnerable when MIRV's and warheads with heightened accuracy were installed on ICBM's and on SLBM's. Furthermore, the equipping of SLBM's with highly accurate warheads has been assigned special priority in plans for U.S. strategic forces up to the year 2000 and beyond. It is also worth recalling that the United States was the first to develop MIRV's and to install them throughout its strategic forces on a mass scale, and this is what gave rise to the entire problem of the heightened vulnerability of the land-based component—in complete accordance with the warnings issued by some of the more farsighted American and Soviet experts at the end of the 1960's. The USSR had no other choice but to respond to U.S. programs by developing similar weapons.

It is equally impossible to agree with the statement that the heightened vulnerability of ICBM's gives the Soviet Union some kind of advantage. The American Minuteman-3 ICBM equipped with new warheads of the MK-12A type is a quite effective counterforce weapon and probably has already made a certain part of Soviet strategic forces just as vulnerable as American forces. According to estimates made public during hearings on the SALT II treaty before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. strategic forces theoretically could destroy 60 percent of all Soviet ICBM's, whereas Soviet forces could destroy 90 percent of American ICBM's. It was also noted at that time, however, that the ICBM's on both sides represent only one of the three components of strategic forces (the strategic triad). Furthermore, they represent only 16 percent of all U.S. strategic weapons, whereas 60 percent of the USSR's weapons are installed on ICBM's.¹ The corresponding ability of the sides to deliver a counterforce strike not only against ICBM silos

but also against all strategic weapons was the following at the beginning of the 1980's: The USSR could have destroyed 22 percent of American strategic potential and the United States could have destroyed 42 percent of the Soviet potential.² In view of the fact that some submarines on bases and aircraft on airfields also can be destroyed by a nuclear strike, the correlation of vulnerable forces on both sides is more or less equal—35-40 percent for each nation. This means that from 60 to 65 percent of their strategic forces are capable of surviving and of delivering a retaliatory strike, which would have 10-15 times the force of the level of unacceptable losses McNamara defined in the 1960's.

The deployment of MX ICBM's with up to 10 MIRV's each will not make the American land-based component of the strategic triad less vulnerable but will heighten the vulnerability of Soviet ICBM's, because the American arsenal will be augmented by 1,000 powerful and highly accurate warheads. Other strategic systems being developed in the United States, including the Trident 2, also will have considerable counterforce potential. The Soviet leadership has repeatedly warned the American side that the deployment of these systems will force the USSR to take the appropriate countermeasures.

Current strategic realities presuppose the ability of Soviet strategic forces to inflict unacceptable losses on the United States in the event of an attack on the USSR or its allies. It is just as obvious that the USSR is physically capable of destroying part of American strategic forces. The United States, however, has at least the same potential, in view of the differing percentages of land-based ICBM's in the strategic arsenals of the two nations. In this sense, both sides are threatened, and approximately to the same degree. Many American experts have taken a similar stand on the "window of vulnerability" in U.S. strategic forces.³ Even those who prefer not to take the Soviet no-first-use pledge into account have to admit that the assumption of a surprise attack on American ICBM silos, where around 20 percent of all American weapons are located, seems quite absurd in general. Even if it were physically possible to destroy all of the other side's ICBM's in silos, this would not leave the attacked side unarmed. It would still have ballistic missiles on submarines in the ocean, virtually invulnerable to strikes by contemporary weapons, and heavy bombers capable of taking off quickly and delivering a devastating strike in conjunction with SLBM's.

In the opinion of, for example, American researchers M. Bunn and K. Tsipis, "after this kind of exchange of strikes, both sides would still be able to deliver devastating strikes against one another."⁴ It is true that this scenario of nuclear attack seems completely unfounded in view of the total absurdity and politico-military impracticability of the concept of "limited nuclear war."

The supporters of the "window of vulnerability" theory also make completely unfounded statements about the possibility that the existence of the potential to destroy

the land-based component of U.S. strategic forces could be used by the Soviet side in a time of crisis to exert pressure on the United States for political concessions. In addition to the fact that adventurist ruses of this kind are alien to Soviet policy, there is the consideration that the side subjected to this kind of pressure will certainly put its strategic forces in a state of complete combat readiness, including its ICBM's, to avert a pre-emptive strike. An attack on a power in a state of readiness could result in the destruction of only empty silos, from which missiles have already been launched for a counterstrike.

Many experts have noted the considerable technical and operational uncertainty of a mass simultaneous strike—the launching of missiles at more than a thousand targets to destroy all ICBM silos. It would be impossible to conduct a full-scale experiment of this kind, and computer simulation cannot lower the degree of uncertainty to a convincing level. During a nuclear strike ballistic missiles will be launched along a combat trajectory rather than the familiar test trajectory, and this will heighten the uncertainty regarding the accuracy of the use of ICBM's, SLBM's, and other missiles in combat. Besides this, the soil particles raised by the explosion of the first warheads will unavoidably reduce the accuracy of the rest. In the opinion of informed American experts, the treaty banning tests of nuclear weapons in the three spheres (including underground nuclear tests), to which the USSR, the United States, and Great Britain are party, makes it virtually impossible to derive reliable estimates of this effect through experiments or to seek realistic ways of surmounting it.⁵ This is one of the cases in which heightened uncertainty on both sides contributes to the stability of the military-strategic balance instead of undermining it, and the arms limitation agreements are among the instruments securing this stabilizing uncertainty.

But even if the hypothetical possibility of an effective strike putting all ICBM's out of commission is assumed, it will have massive implications connected with the annihilation of millions of people, which has been proved conclusively by research. According to some American estimates, an attack on only the ICBM silos located in sparsely populated areas of the United States could result in the loss of from 5 million to 18 million civilians (primarily as a result of radioactive fallout).⁶ If the delivered strikes cover a broader range of military targets (up to 1,200) with the use of 3,000 warheads, U.S. human losses, according to W. Doherty, B. Levy, and F. Von Hippel, could range from 13 million to 34 million, depending on air currents at the time of the explosions and some other factors.⁷ According to U.S. Defense Department estimates of the early 1970's, American casualties resulting from strikes against just ICBM silos, airfields, heavy bombers, and submarine bases with SLBM's will range from 5.6 million to 18.3 million.⁸ Therefore, strikes of this kind certainly cannot be viewed as a selective nuclear duel exclusively between the

ICBM's of the opposing sides, as some American strategists regard them. From the political, military, and moral standpoints, this kind of strike is nothing other than an act of total thermonuclear aggression with all of the ensuing catastrophic consequences.

When we speak of the possibility of destroying a significant part of the strategic arsenals of the sides, we must consider the prospect of the development of highly accurate warheads with relatively low explosive force which can be manipulated in the final phase and hypothetically could destroy strategic objects without any substantial side effects.⁹ It is obvious that the development of weapons of this kind could create additional illusions regarding the possibility of fighting a "limited nuclear war." This danger must be taken into account in forecasts of the development of the military-strategic balance and the level of its stability. We must also consider the probability of the development of other weapons capable of reducing the force of a retaliatory strike, particularly air defense systems and strategic antisubmarine weapons based on the latest scientific and technical achievements.

The qualitative reorganization of strategic forces began in the first half of the 1980's and was first reflected in the capability of the naval component of these forces to destroy hardened targets. Current U.S. military programs envisage the deployment of a large quantity of weapons for the destruction of highly mobile targets in addition to weapons for strikes against "priority"¹⁰ hardened targets. This is the designated purpose of the airborne component of the triad and of sea- and land-based long-range cruise missiles.

When the Soviet Union took measures to secure the invulnerability of its strategic forces, it began deploying variable-launch ICBM's in the first half of the 1980's while staying within the framework of the SALT II treaty.¹¹

The Soviet side simultaneously made vigorous attempts to prevent the start of a new round in the development of the counterforce potential of the sides, which could reduce the stability of the military-strategic balance dramatically. This was the express purpose of the Soviet proposals put forth in Reykjavik on the reduction of the strategic arms of both sides by 50 percent. Furthermore, with a view to the objective equalization of the counterforce properties of ICBM's and SLBM's, the reduction of each of the components of the triad, including Soviet ICBM's, was proposed.¹² The Soviet-proposed total ban on nuclear tests would be another step in this direction because it would seriously impede the development of new nuclear weapons by both sides.

As for the potentially increased vulnerability of the naval component of strategic forces, the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's), the Soviet proposals on the limitation of the antisubmarine activity of the

sides—for example, by creating zones in which all anti-submarine activity by the other side will be prohibited—are intended to enhance the stability of the military-strategic balance with a view to this factor. The Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat recommended the commencement of Soviet-American talks on this matter in 1984.¹³

Therefore, any analysis of the stability of the military-strategic balance must take the entire group of military-technical aspects, some of which are overlooked or deliberately ignored by most American experts, into account. By concentrating completely on the comparative potential of Soviet and American ICBM's to destroy hardened targets, an area in which a definite asymmetry in favor of the Soviet Union objectively came into being in the 1970's, they disregard a multitude of other factors of equal or even much greater importance from the standpoint of their disruptive effects on the balance. Above all, these include the reduction of flight time (8-12 minutes for the Pershing 2, as compared to the 25-30 minutes of the land-based ICBM's), which complicates the use of detection and warning systems and effectively reduces to a minimum the time during which the political leadership must make a decision on a retaliatory strike. In other words, it disrupts strategic stability. Other such factors are the possibility of launches along unpredictable trajectories, which is primarily true of modern and projected SLBM's and long-range cruise missiles. Another factor is the reduced possibility of radar and infrared detection as a result of the use of the "Stealth" technology in building bombers and cruise missiles. Finally, there are still difficulties in securing reliable two-way communications between SSBN's and command centers, and this increases the danger of the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

When we assess the role of various weapons systems, we must not forget the difference in the geostrategic positions of the sides and in the history of the formation of their strategic forces. In particular, we cannot, as many American experts customarily do, regard the ICBM only as a first-strike weapon (or a weapon of actual warfare) and the SLBM only as a retaliatory weapon (or a deterrent). Chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces S.F. Akhromeyev remarked that "strategic offensive arms are now almost equal in terms of their destructive potential. There is no difference in the combat effectiveness of the Soviet ICBM and the American Trident SLBM. This is why strategic arms should be viewed and assessed as a group, as a single entity."¹⁴

The ICBM is not inferior to the SLBM as a deterrent, and in some respects it is even superior to the latter. Communications with the former are much more reliable, are two-way, and have backup capability. A strike against ICBM's would be a strike on the territory of the opponent and would therefore be tantamount to starting a nuclear world war. In contrast to the SSBN in the sea or a bomber in the air, the ICBM cannot be used in a local armed conflict and cannot increase the threat of the

growth of a local confrontation into a global one, or a non-nuclear conflict into a nuclear one. Even if ICBM's should become vulnerable, a counterstrike will still be technically possible—i.e., retaliatory forces could be launched while the missiles and warheads of the other side are still in flight. The side planning a pre-emptive strike can never exclude the possibility of a counterstrike by the adversary. These characteristics of ICBM's and SLBM's must be taken fully into account in considerations of the possibility of securing the stability of the military-strategic balance at lower levels of nuclear confrontation as the corresponding agreements are reached on nuclear arms reduction.

Many Western experts have recently placed an emphasis on the development and improvement of early warning, command, control, and communication systems, regarding them as almost the main way of strengthening strategic stability. A closer look at this approach points up its inconsistency with the actual role of these elements of the macrosystem of the military-strategic balance. It seems obvious that the improvement of command and communication systems and especially of early warning systems can and should be regarded as one way of enhancing the controllability and reliability of nuclear forces from the standpoint of the prevention of their accidental or unauthorized use. At the same time, the other side could regard these measures as preparations for nuclear war by a potential adversary, because winning this kind of war would necessitate the retention of control over troops and the state. For this reason, the development of command and communication systems is one of the matters requiring thorough joint investigation by the sides to determine the exact forms of activity in this sphere that might enhance or diminish strategic stability.

The nature and forms of countermeasures by the other side to restore the military-strategic balance warrant special consideration. It appears that they can be divided in general into measures intended expressly to neutralize specific military-technical systems and measures which pose an equivalent threat to the side striving for superiority and heightening its vulnerability. The response to the development of weapons with a short flight time, for example, could be the enhancement of mobility and the replication of early warning, command, and communication systems. The expansion of the counterforce capabilities of American ICBM's and SLBM's would evoke such countermeasures as the transfer of some land-based missiles to mobile launchers, the enhancement of the survivability (with longer-range missiles) of the SSBN fleet, the modernization of long-range aviation, and the equipping of these aircraft with cruise missiles. All of this would be done to reduce the American potential for a pre-emptive strike and to maintain the USSR's potential for an adequate nuclear response. The development of the "Stealth" technology could be neutralized to a considerable extent by the improvement of radar equipment, including the use of broader operational frequency

range, the use of infrared sensors and automated equipment, and the unification of several radar stations transmitting information to one another in numerical form. The shielding of infrared energy is an exceptionally difficult task because the shielding methods can have an adverse effect on the aerodynamic properties of aircraft and increase the effective field of diffusion, which would simplify radar detection.¹⁵

As for countermeasures posing an equivalent threat in response to the United States' attempts to gain advantages by increasing its counterforce potential, they also restore the military-strategic balance, but on a higher and, what is most important, less stable level. At the end of the cycle of these actions and counteractions the military-strategic balance will be less stable than before.

The process of choosing and taking countermeasures often entails a combination of the two options mentioned above, especially in view of the ability of many strategic systems to simultaneously reduce the possibility of a counterforce strike by the other side and increase the corresponding threat to the opponent (after all, the new weapons systems frequently combine heightened survivability with increased destructive force). At times, on the other hand, a choice must be made between these options because some of the properties of weapons systems are strengthened at the technical and economic expense of others. A maximum response for both purposes combined would make the preservation of the balance much more expensive than attempts to disrupt it. The possible effects of the U.S. deployment of a broad-scale ABM system with a space tier and potential Soviet countermeasures on the stability of the military-strategic balance warrant special consideration in this context.

Let us consider the possibility of the deployment of such systems by both sides, which is exactly what Reagan Administration spokesmen are promoting. At any stage, particularly the initial one, each side would be capable of developing a partially effective system. Both sides, proceeding from an assessment of the worst possible scenario of probable military conflicts, would regard the ABM system of the adversary as a threat to deliver a counterstrike. Each side would respond to this threat by developing the means of counteracting the ABM system and augmenting its own offensive forces. The strategic instability engendered by space ABM systems will also be reflected in the ability to turn the so-called "defensive" space weapon into an offensive one, which will start by putting the other side's ABM counterpart out of commission (and losing only a negligible portion of its own combat potential in this process). Even if it were possible to disregard the political realities of today's world, to trust the peaceful assurances of the SDI's supporters implicitly, and to begin the parallel deployment of strategic defense systems on both sides, there would still be several serious factors diminishing the stability of the military-strategic balance.

As mentioned above, the colossal destructive force of nuclear weapons eliminates most of the differences between the technical characteristics of individual elements of the offensive strategic forces of the sides and differences in the structure of these forces. The addition of offensive space weapons and antimissile weapons to the equation of the military-strategic balance changes the situation. The effectiveness of ABM systems (especially with a space tier) will depend much more and to a qualitatively different degree on their technical characteristics (the accuracy of detection and tracking equipment, the reliability of the computer elements of the battle management subsystem, the intensity of space- or ground-based lasers, etc.) and on the geographic location of the offensive strategic forces of both sides. Besides this, many of the characteristics of the potential antimissile weapon will be difficult, if not impossible, to verify by national technical means and even by on-site inspections.¹⁶

All of these considerations, along with economic and politico-psychological factors, provide stronger arguments in favor of asymmetrical countermeasures by the USSR in the event of the deployment of a broad-scale ABM system with a space tier. In this case, the military-strategic balance will still be more stable than if the Soviet Union were to develop a similar system. Obviously, it would be far preferable, particularly from the standpoint of strategic stability, to prevent this new round of the arms race, especially if this could include measures for the radical reduction of strategic offensive arms in accordance with the formula proposed by the USSR in Reykjavik.

In general, however, we can say that the new cycles of action and reaction in the arms race, if it is not stopped and if steps are not taken toward nuclear disarmament, will gradually diminish the stability of the military-strategic balance. It is worth repeating that the stability of this balance cannot be secured effectively on a unilateral basis. This requires joint efforts, based on the common interest of the sides in the prevention of nuclear war, in the heightened stability of the macrosystem of strategic interaction, and in the lowering of its quantitative level with the aid of jointly chosen criteria of strategic stability.

The real possibility of the joint control of this system will come into being only as a result of the conclusion and implementation of agreements on the radical reduction of nuclear weapons to the point of their complete elimination. These reductions, combined with the prevention of the deployment of weapons in space and the retention of the ABM Treaty, would reduce the scales of the object of control, and this alone would make a substantial contribution to the enhancement of the stability of the military-strategic balance.

Footnotes

1. G.A. Arbatov and W. Oltmans, "Entering the Eighties," Moscow, 1984, pp 177-178.

2. "Razoruzheniye i bezopasnost 1986" [Disarmament and Security 1986], vol 1, Moscow, 1987, p 39.

3. The U.S. Commission on Strategic Forces, which conducted investigations from 1982 to 1984 under the supervision of retired General B. Scowcroft, President G. Ford's former national security adviser, actually criticized the "window of vulnerability" theory. The commission's report said that even if American ICBM's should be destroyed by a surprise mass strike, the American side would still have its SLBM's and many heavy bombers with nuclear weapons comparable to ICBM warheads in terms of accuracy and force. The fact is that although bombers are vulnerable on airfields, the simultaneous destruction of ICBM's and bombers is impossible because of the difficulty of coordinating this kind of strike until such time as SLBM's are capable of effectively destroying ICBM silos. This is precisely why the United States denied the need to keep some of its bombers in the air at all times, which was the practice in the late 1950's and early 1960's when strategic aviation was the main component of U.S. nuclear strength, and put part of them on a 15-minute flight alert instead ("Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces," Wash., April 1983, pp 7-8).

4. M. Bunn and K. Tsipis, "Ballistic Missile Guidance and Technical Uncertainties of Countersilo Attacks," Boston, 1983, p 107.

5. Ibid., p 104.

6. F. Von Hippel, "The Effects of Nuclear War," Princeton, 1983, p 32.

7. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, vol 10, No 4, Spring 1986, p 5.

8. "Effects of Limited Nuclear Warfare. Hearings..., U.S. Senate," 1975, pp 21, 31.

9. M. Bunn and K. Tsipis, Op. cit., p 105.

10. The destruction of ICBM's must be a quick operation: They must be destroyed before they begin leaving the silos.

11. PRAVDA, 11 December 1985.

12. Ibid., 14 October 1986.

13. "The Issue of the Nuclear Freeze. The Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat," Moscow, 1984, p 11.

14. PRAVDA, 19 October 1985.

15. F. Dmitriyev, "The Work on the 'Stealth' Program in the United States," ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 1985, No 11, p 51.

16. R.Z. Sagdeyev and O.F. Prilutskiy, "Strategic Defense and Strategic Stability. The Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat," Moscow, 1985; "Kosmicheskoye oruzhiye: dilemma bezopasnosti" [Space Weapons: Security Dilemma], edited by Ye.P. Velikhov, R.Z. Sagdeyev, and A.A. Kokoshin, Moscow, 1986, pp 140-141.

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NATO Reaction to INF Agreement Examined
18030002c Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 87 (signed to press 17 Sep 87) pp 25-34

[Article by S.A. Karaganov: "Western Europe, the United States, and the Issue of Disarmament"]

[Text] The reaction of the majority of West European NATO countries to the real possibility of the removal of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) from Europe came as a surprise to many. In recent years they have been extremely active in promoting talks, have requested the USSR and the United States to take a more flexible approach, and have supported the American "zero option." But as soon as the USSR put forth a similar proposal, "taking the United States at its word," and an agreement seemed near at hand, the idea of ridding Europe of the INF suddenly aroused fear in Bonn, London, and Paris, and additional obstacles began to be erected to impede its implementation. The issue of operational-tactical missiles (OTM), for example, suddenly became a priority matter. Members of West European governments suddenly began to say that as long as intermediate-range missiles had to be reduced, they should reserve the "right" to accumulate OTM's. The response to this idea in Washington was enthusiastic. The USSR, striving for a turn for the better in the international political situation and attempting to remove the obstacles from the disarmament process, agreed in April 1987 to the complete and simultaneous elimination of Soviet and American OTM's in Europe and then proposed the elimination of all Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles and OTM's. It seemed that the United States and the West European NATO governments had run out of arguments, but the radical lowering of the level of nuclear confrontation is still being resisted.

Let us try to look for the causes of this two-faced position in light of the general support in the West European capitals for the continuation of disarmament talks.

In the eyes of West Europeans the process of the negotiation of arms limitation has acquired symbolic significance in the last two and a half decades. This was pointed out on 9 September 1985 by Chancellor of the

FRG H. Kohl when he said that the mere continuation of the Geneva dialogue was enough to promote dialogue between the East and West in general.

There were also internal factors explaining the adherence of the West European capitals to the negotiation process. One of the main internal causes was the somewhat different views in Europe than in America with regard to security and the ways of guaranteeing it. Whereas most of the members of U.S. ruling circles take a militarized technocratic approach to the matter, viewing security as a function of primarily military strength, many members of West European ruling circles have a broader view of security, in accordance with which, as English expert P. Williams wrote, "political, social, or economic instability in Europe is just as dangerous as outside aggression."¹ In view of this, excessive expenditures on arms are almost as dangerous as military weakness. Furthermore, the strong leftwing opposition forces West European ruling circles to display more flexibility and gives them more incentive to slow down the growth of military budgets.

Prominent conservative American expert on public opinion W. Schneider concluded that if "increasing tension between East and West should make the West Europeans feel more vulnerable, they would prefer to respond by reducing the chances of provoking a conflict rather than by strengthening their defenses."² "The West Europeans," Vice Chancellor H.D. Genscher of the FRG wrote in a policy statement, "are willing to make sacrifices for the sake of defense only when they are convinced that military expenditures will contribute to a stable peace. The atmosphere of confrontation, on the other hand, increases the fear of weapons."³ For ruling circles in the West European countries the "military deterrence plus detente" formula in the "Harmel Report," on which NATO strategy has been based since 1967, is indissoluble. It means that the absence of the second part of the formula in Western Europe can destroy support for the first part. The strategic arms limitation talks and the corresponding agreements, especially the ABM Treaty, are viewed by West Europeans as visible symbols of detente. This is the reason for the need to preserve past accomplishments in arms limitation.

This is why the allies demanded—and with some success—that the United States continue and resume aborted talks. They are also exerting some pressure on Washington today for its decision to renounce the SALT II treaty and its attempt to undermine the ABM Treaty. The West European capitals, even those most loyal to Washington, Bonn and London, openly announced their opposition to Washington's intention to undermine the ABM Treaty with its so-called "broad interpretation." The political costs of this move for Washington have risen.

Finally, ruling circles in Western Europe have had to deal with the reality of the strong antinuclear feelings of the public in their countries. The need to neutralize

public pressure gives them an even greater interest in the talks. And the support of the talks naturally necessitates an insistence on nuclear disarmament and even the agreement to some real steps in this direction.

But the paradox here is that although the West European capitals have an interest in the nuclear arms limitation and reduction talks, they do not always have an interest in the reductions themselves. This is particularly true of the nuclear weapons systems deployed in Western Europe or earmarked for NATO. More than once, although never as loudly as after Reykjavik, London, Bonn, and Paris demanded Washington's refusal to agree to limits on these systems. This was the case, in particular, when the SALT II treaty was being hammered out and when conservative and even not very conservative strategists and politicians in Western Europe issued an ultimatum, demanding that American forward-based systems capable of reaching targets in the USSR not be included among the systems subject to limitation,⁴ and then Chancellor of the FRG H. Schmidt, among others, insisted that Soviet medium-range weapons be included among these systems.⁵ West European officials were particularly persistent in demanding the inclusion of the Soviet medium bomber called "Backfire" in the West among these systems.⁶

Therefore, the West European capitals favor talks and call for the reduction of nuclear arsenals, but as soon as real reductions become a possibility, particularly reductions of not only Soviet nuclear arms but also of American nuclear weapons deployed in Europe or earmarked for it, their enthusiasm for disarmament is replaced by evasiveness or even outright hostility.

The experience of the last 10 or 15 years provides grounds for the fairly confident statement that West European ruling circles, especially their conservative members, are still against the idea of the dramatic lowering of the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, not to mention the removal of nuclear weapons from the continent. They are suffering from something that might be termed "nuclear addiction": They are afraid of nuclear weapons but they cannot seriously consider giving them up.

The European nuclear powers have their own reasons to be wary of nuclear disarmament. Their ruling circles are afraid that it would sooner or later affect their nuclear programs. And for Great Britain and France, nuclear warheads are not mere weapons. They are the symbols with which they claim the status of great powers.

But let us return to the common causes of the "nuclear addiction" of most West European capitals.

The main one is probably the tendency of ruling circles in these countries to believe in their own propaganda and their own myth of the "Soviet military threat." This

"threat" is kept alive primarily by the deeply ingrained belief in the "superiority" of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries in general-purpose armed forces.

This fear seems completely unfounded and almost incomprehensible to us. We know that our intentions are peaceful and that they exclude the possibility of starting a war or threatening to start one against anyone whatsoever. We also know that superiority is not the issue in question. The fighting capabilities of the NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces are equal in general.⁷ Equivalent assessments have been made—and with increasing frequency in the last few years—even by many Western experts, including Americans.⁸

After the April (1985) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the 27th CPSU Congress, and the January (1987) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the growth of the peace movement caused the gradual erosion of the myth of the "Soviet threat." But this process is far from complete. The fear engendered by this myth is largely irrational and is related more directly to psychology than to physical reality. It is partly a product of Western Europe's geopolitical position: Its defenses do not have the strategic depth of Warsaw Pact defenses. Finally, members of military-political circles in the West European countries have expressed apprehension with regard to certain aspects of the structure of Warsaw Pact troops (primarily the slight advantage in tanks) and the nature of maneuvers. They are also suspicious of our military doctrine. These suspicions are largely the product of the confrontation which has been imposed upon the European continent and which causes each side to look at the other "through the sights of a gun" and to see it as an adversary, with a lack of trust from the very start.

Let us take a look at U.S. policy in recent years. If a country is defenseless, such as Grenada, troops are sent out against it. If the United States is far superior to the country, as in the case of Nicaragua, it engages in shameless and flagrant intervention and blackmail. If impunity is a certainty, the United States acts like a pirate, as it did in Libya and Lebanon. In the case of Cuba, on the other hand, a country which is despised but has a strong friendship with the Soviet Union, the United States only shakes a fist at it. And when it comes to the Soviet Union, which is equally strong, the United States avoids direct confrontation and confines itself to spiteful rhetoric.

A parallel is drawn from this: If the United States reacts in these ways to the balance of military forces, then the Soviet Union must do the same. The West European capitals, whose policy has been built on the "balance of power" concept for centuries, are trying to "balance" the existing or potential strength of the USSR with reliance on the United States, and especially on its "nuclear guarantees."

The interest in remaining reliant on them is a product of the severe structural crisis of the entire system of politico-military ties within NATO. The reliability of the "guarantees"—i.e., the willingness of the United States to always "come to the aid of its allies"—has been greatly diminished, and this is motivating the West European capitals, which still cannot see any realistic alternative to the existing system of politico-military ties, to try to strengthen these "guarantees" (this is the reason for the "double-track decision" of 1979 and for the current reluctance to work toward the reduction of nuclear arms in Europe and even attempts to augment some categories of weapons).

The reliability of the "guarantees" began its decline back in the 1950's, when the United States lost its strategic invulnerability. American superiority in the nuclear sphere in the number of warheads and in the accuracy and flexibility of strategic and tactical systems, however, "alleviated" the problem. Between 1971 and 1976 the United States indulged in new vigorous attempts to obtain additional strategic advantages. The installation of MIRV's on ICBM's and SLBM's almost doubled the total number of weapons in the American strategic arsenal. At the same time, the "Schlesinger doctrine" of 1974 and 1975, which substantiated this race for superiority, including the reinforcement of U.S. "guarantees" for the allies, was supposed to reduce the allies' anxiety.

The situation began to change in the second half of the 1970's. The USSR responded by deploying MIRV's on its missiles. This led to the elimination of U.S. advantages at the end of the 1970's and to the achievement of actual parity in the fighting capabilities of strategic forces. West European experts on nuclear strategy began expressing the worry, fueled overseas, that the American "nuclear guarantees" and the concept of "extended deterrence" had been undermined severely and were even being destroyed by the parity and heightened flexibility of Soviet strategic forces.⁹

Another change in the military balance made the situation seem even more alarming to ruling circles in the West European countries. Until the second half of the 1970's NATO activity was based on the assumption of this bloc's superior nuclear forces in the European theater of military operations. An official report submitted to Congress in 1978 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest U.S. military authority, said that "the United States has retained its superiority in theater nuclear forces in general, but it must continue developing and deploying new systems in response to Soviet modernizing efforts."¹⁰

The American advantages stemmed from the higher number of nuclear weapons possessed by and assigned to NATO and from the quality of delivery vehicles. Soviet nuclear arms intended for a retaliatory strike in Europe were considered to be highly vulnerable.

The modernization of Warsaw Pact armed forces led to a situation in which the United States and NATO lost their presumed capability for "escalation dominance" in a nuclear war. According to the American line of reasoning, this meant that the adversary would lose all reasonable chances of escalating an armed conflict because each new rung of the escalation ladder would put him in a less advantageous position. This concept served as the theoretical grounds for the theory of the "first nuclear strike in Europe" and the hope of "limiting" a nuclear war in Europe and "winning" it. All of these ideas were supposed to confirm the reliability of the "nuclear guarantees."

The result of the changes in the nuclear balance on the central and European levels was, as B. Lambeth, the leading RAND Corporation analyst, wrote, "the effective loss of the United States' capability for escalation dominance over the USSR as a result of Moscow's achievement of strategic parity and theater parity."¹¹

The same conclusion was stated in the extremely authoritative RAND report on the NATO agenda: "Changes in USSR armed forces have undermined NATO's earlier capability for escalation dominance and have allowed the USSR to worry less about the threat of conflict escalation than before."¹²

The reduced reliability of the "nuclear guarantees" was even more apparent when the tendency toward "unilateral action" in American policy grew more pronounced, especially under the Reagan Administration. This tendency was reflected in the SDI, in the inclination to pay less and less attention to the allies, and in the stronger support, even in traditional pro-Atlantic circles, for the withdrawal of all or part of American troops from Europe.¹³

The tendency has apparently caused West European strategists to assign greater value to already emplaced nuclear systems, both as "deterrents" and as means of preventing the further separation of the United States from European security.

After all, nuclear weapons in Europe—and here we are approaching another cause of "nuclear addiction" in the West European capitals—are seen by West European strategists as something necessary not only and not so much for the "deterrence" of the USSR. They play a much more complex role. They must prevent the separation of the United States from a conflict in Europe. People in Western Europe are fully aware of the American strategists' expectations in the event of this kind of war. One of the most candid of these, Georgetown University Professor E. Ravenal, formulated these expectations: "It is in the American interest to avoid...involvement in a conflict that could be limited to Europe."¹⁴ This scenario frightens the West European allies. The prospect of U.S. separation, they feel, could lessen the motives to avoid a crisis capable of starting a war in Europe. And without this, the United States,

because of its policy and its relative distance from Europe, is viewed by West Europeans as a country prepared "to take provocative actions putting the allies in a much more dangerous position than America itself."¹⁵

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara explained the logic of the European supporters of missiles quite accurately: "The key element of the 'double-track' decision was that the new missiles would be capable of delivering strikes within the USSR, evoking a Soviet attack on the United States and an American attack on all of the territory of the USSR. In this way, the new systems are supposed to unite U.S. strategic forces with the armed forces deployed in Europe."¹⁶ It turns out that the strategic plans of the West European capitals rely indirectly on the USSR for the prevention of war and the prevention of the implementation of U.S. plans to limit the war to Europe. "The allies," renowned expert R. Betts from the Brookings Institution wrote in this connection, "are relying on the USSR's persistent assertions that it will regard a strike by intermediate-range forces as a strike by strategic forces and will respond accordingly."¹⁷ This applies not only to medium-range weapons but also to nuclear weapons in general. After all, the USSR has announced its non-acceptance of any kind of theory of "limited nuclear war," regardless of the type of nuclear weapons with which the United States intends to start this war.

Therefore, the West European capitals favored the emplacement of INF and other nuclear weapons in Europe and are now trying to interfere with their reduction, and not only because they want to secure the "deterrence" of the USSR, not to mention the creation of a counterbalance to Soviet weapons. The reason is their lack of faith in the reliability of their patron and in its "nuclear guarantees" and their hope of strengthening them, even against the patron's own wishes.

The West European capitals are being led astray, however, by their "nuclear addiction." They believe that nuclear weapons "unite" Europe and the United States, but many people in Washington have a quite different view of them—less as means of unification than as a powerful addition to first-strike potential and another "buffer" between European and worldwide nuclear war.

The result is a typical NATO compromise-paradox. The West Europeans are trying to hang onto "means of unification" which Washington does not regard as such (but the decision to use them will be made by Washington). As influential expert and former U.S. Under Secretary of State G. Ball wrote, "there is no reason to expect the American President to be more inclined to break the nuclear taboo by launching missiles based in Europe than to launch strategic missiles based in the United States."¹⁸

At the same time, the nuclear weapons in Europe—old and new—will almost automatically involve the West European countries in any conflict the United States might start.

One of the reasons that most of the members of ruling circles in the West European countries still want to keep the nuclear weapons is the widespread belief in Western Europe that reliance on nuclear weapons, primarily American weapons, allows them to economize on military expenditures.

This belief, however, is only a myth. The weapons played this role only until the other side also had them. By the beginning of 1953 NATO was already conducting maneuvers simulating the use of nuclear weapons by both sides, and it turned out that the use of nuclear weapons increased personnel and equipment losses dramatically and necessitated an increase in their number and the enhancement of mobility and readiness. Besides this, the disposition of nuclear weapons among troops requires a huge additional infrastructure and protective measures and therefore raises expenditures.¹⁹ The man who led these maneuvers, General J. Gavin, later wrote: "One conclusion is obvious, even though it was hotly debated for many years: A successful war using nuclear weapons necessitates more, and not fewer, soldiers."²⁰

But the myth took hold. It turned out to be convenient for the West Europeans, and they still use the existence of nuclear weapons in Europe and their reliance on them to validate their reluctance to give in to American demands for the buildup of general-purpose forces.

It is possible that the West Europeans have been able to economize in each individual case in comparison with what their bloc patron demanded from them. The amount saved, however, was and is paltry: They economized on trifles while losing huge amounts. After all, the presence of nuclear weapons on one side forces the other to respond by building up its nuclear and conventional forces, and this then evokes a counterreaction and generates an arms race in several fields.

Finally, one of the most important reasons for the reluctance of many members of ruling circles in the West European countries to rid Europe of nuclear weapons is the belief that they prevent the outbreak of war, conventional as well as nuclear. According to this line of reasoning, increasing the destructive force of a conflict makes it unthinkable. In Western Europe there is a strong belief that a non-nuclear balance is unreliable in the prevention of war. At the beginning of both world holocausts the opposing sides had approximately equal military potential.

The groundlessness of reliance on nuclear deterrence was revealed by M.S. Gorbachev when he spoke in Moscow on 16 February 1987: "The 'nuclear safeguard' is neither faultless nor permanent. It can turn into a death sentence for mankind at any time.... In essence, this is a policy of

threats. Each behavior pattern has its own inner logic: When threats are used as a policy instrument, there is the natural desire that each such threat be taken seriously by everyone. This, however, requires that threats be backed up by actions periodically. In this case, by the use of military force. The only possible conclusion is that the policy of deterrence, viewed in historical perspective, not only does not reduce the possibility of armed conflicts but even increases it."²¹

Besides this, this policy is a powerful and constant generator of tension, mistrust, and the arms race, and this alone makes it dangerous because it gives rise to instability and reproduces the threat of war.

If nuclear arms reduction and the creation of the system of common security proposed by the Soviet Union are not enough to convince West Europeans that war can be prevented reliably, why are they reluctant to learn the obvious lessons from Chernobyl? Is it necessary to make war inconceivably horrible by keeping arms which will make this war more probable? After all, "nuclear deterrence" will exist in Europe even without nuclear weapons. What would even a non-nuclear war mean on a continent where 200 power units are installed in nuclear power plants? It would be a terrible, if not lethal, blow to European civilization. Is this not enough to deter any kind of war, even if West European politicians cannot put their trust in good judgment?

According to the popular NATO mythology, nuclear weapons are also necessary to the West Europeans "to instill confidence in them." As prominent English strategist M. Howard wrote in his widely known article, the American military presence and, what is most important, American nuclear weapons "are needed by Western Europe not only because of their negative role as a means of deterring the USSR but also because of their positive role as a means of instilling confidence and reassuring the West Europeans, the same kind of reassurance a child expects from his parents, or a cripple from his doctors, when he contemplates dangers which might be remote but are difficult to ignore."²² It is possible that Howard has accurately, although with obvious contempt, described this cause of the "nuclear addiction" in the West European capitals, but we could ask who is made more confident by the nuclear weapons in Europe. Probably only those who are most afraid not of war, but of the elimination of the mistrust and the politico-military discord in Europe and the creation of another, more reliable and humane system of security there. The rest, on the contrary, are more prone to be alarmed by these weapons. There has been a split in almost all of the leading West European countries between the majority, rejecting nuclear weapons, and ruling circles, striving to keep them. In fact, there has even been a split in these circles: Antinuclear and antimilitarist feelings have grown perceptibly stronger in several socialist and even centrist parties. "For all of the last decade," French

military strategist P. Lelouche wrote with obvious irritation, "Western Europe has gone further and further in denying the need for nuclear energy both for civilian purposes and for military use."²³

The mounting antinuclear feelings and stronger influence of common sense on military policy, including the policy of West European states, are not the only indications of the possibility of curing the "nuclear addiction" of some members of the ruling circles of these states.

There is a growing awareness in Western Europe of the inadequacy, unreliability, and dangers of current NATO strategy. It is becoming clearer that the solvency of the American "nuclear guarantees" cannot be restored and that the security of West European countries must be based on a more reliable foundation than "nuclear deterrence."

The Pentagon is trying to surmount the "crisis in NATO" by lessening the bloc's reliance on nuclear weapons and building up non-nuclear potential with a new generation of conventional arms of a clearly offensive nature and with a longer range and stronger destructive capabilities. This is the main purpose of the American concept of "air and land battle" and of its NATO counterpart, the concept of the "deep echeloned strike." Here the American strategists and politicians are hoping to attain several objectives at once: to exert stronger military pressure on socialism and draw it into an arms race in new areas, to reinforce mistrust and tension in Europe and thereby maintain or even intensify the dependence of their allies, and to frustrate the attempts to surmount the military confrontation on the continent. The West European allies accepted the new concept under pressure from Washington, but they are in no hurry to act on it by purchasing the necessary systems.

The conviction that this concept will destabilize the military and political situation in Europe even more is growing stronger in Western Europe, and not only among liberals and social democrats. By the same token, there is a stronger desire to find an escape from the current situation through arms reduction. It is being stimulated by the need to economize on military expenditures and by the prospect of the dramatic increase (doubling) of the number of people of draft age in the FRG and several other countries.

Various ideas with regard to "non-provocative defense"—systems of military-technical and doctrinal measures to reduce the possibility of attack, especially surprise attack—have been gaining popularity in Western Europe in recent years. These are policy goals of the social democratic and socialist parties in the FRG, Denmark, Norway, and some other NATO countries. They are becoming increasingly popular among some centrists and even some conservatives. These traditional concepts of West European politico-military thinking are

supported by some NATO officials.²⁴ Washington and the European groups most closely affiliated with it do not propose disarmament as a solution.

This solution, however, has been proposed by the USSR and its allies in a program for the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces. The Soviet Union believes that forces should be balanced "not by building up the side lagging behind, but by reducing the forces of the leading side."²⁵ Soviet proposals to rid Europe of chemical weapons, OTM's, tactical aviation and so forth are part of the same context.

The 27th CPSU Congress stated the need to "act in such a way as to give no one any cause for fear, even imaginary."²⁶ This is why the USSR and its allies, which have many reasons themselves to be alarmed in view of the aggressive nature of many NATO military concepts, issued an appeal in the Budapest Warsaw Pact statement (of 1986) for the elimination of the mutual suspicions and mistrust that have been accumulating for years and for the thorough consideration of one another's concerns. The statement said that "the military concepts and doctrines of both alliances should be based on defensive principles."²⁷

A big step in building stronger confidence was taken at the Berlin conference of the Political Consultative Committee in May 1987, when the document "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact States" was adopted and declared the strictly defensive purposes of this doctrine and the main goals of the organization.²⁸

New ideas are being put forth in all areas of European cooperation. The goal is to surmount the military confrontation in Europe, which is compounding all of the political problems dividing the continent, and the legacy of the "cold war" imposed upon the continent and to create a new, stable, and humane system of relations between states.

Soviet policy is already producing results. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the West to prevent success in negotiations or to remain silent. When Chancellor H. Kohl of the FRG tried to impede the advancement of the INF talks in May 1987, his party soon suffered perceptible political injuries and was defeated in local elections. He had to change his position. At a press conference on 27 August the chancellor announced that under certain circumstances the FRG would be able to refuse to modernize its Pershing-1A missiles and even to destroy them (the question of these missiles was raised, as we know, in connection with Washington's refusal to include them among the American nuclear warheads in the draft Soviet-American INF and OTM agreement).

A declaration on East-West relations was adopted at a meeting of the leaders of the seven main capitalist powers in Venice in June 1987 and, despite all of its stipulations, was worded in positive terms. The Reykjavik session of the NATO Council on 11 and 12 June

1987 favored the conclusion of a Soviet-American INF and OTM agreement. Some stipulations were also made at this time, especially by the FRG, but something else is also apparent: The bold and decisive policy of the Soviet Union is forcing the other side to reconsider familiar stereotypes and is creating new opportunities for the reduction of military, including nuclear, confrontation in the world.

Advocating vigorous action to lower the level of military confrontation in Europe and eventually eliminate this confrontation and to lessen mutual fears and suspicions, the USSR proposes measures to strengthen stability on the continent. The alleviation of suspicion will objectively create the necessary conditions to cure ruling circles in Western Europe of their "nuclear addiction." After all, the object is a system of European security that will make nuclear weapons obviously unnecessary.

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Canada-U.S. Forming Regional Military-Industrial Complex

18030002d Moscow SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 10, Oct 87 (signed to press 17 Sep 87) pp 35-44

[Article by A.G. Kvasov]

[Text] In the last decade a unified American-Canadian military-industrial complex has been taking shape gradually under the U.S. aegis in North America under the influence of economic and political factors. The increasing integration of the military economies of the two states is expanding the material, technical, and resource base of the North American military industry and is giving American imperialism more opportunities for manipulation in the distribution of the economic costs and political responsibilities of building up military strength. In addition, the military-economic integration of Canada and the United States is part of the foundation on which the North American imperialist power center is based.

Stages of Development

Proceeding from the notorious theory of the "Soviet military threat," the United States and Canada regard the defense of the North American continent as a common cause. The history of the continental approach to defense already spans half a century. When President F. Roosevelt of the United States first discussed general aspects of joint defense with Prime Minister W. Mackenzie King of Canada, he said that "the American people will not be passive observers of a threat to Canadian sovereignty." In response, the prime minister stated what then became the classic formula of Canadian-American military relations: "We also have our obligations as good friends and neighbors. One of them is to do everything within our power to prevent the invasion of our country, but if this should happen, we must keep the enemy from entering the United States by land, sea, or air through Canadian territory."¹

Another important meeting of the heads of the two governments took place in 1940 and resulted in the Ogdensburg Declaration, authorizing the creation of a permanent combined defense council—the first joint Canadian-American military body. The main reasons for the interaction of Canada and the United States directly in the sphere of military industry, however, were actually

first recorded in the Hyde Park Declaration of April 1941. This agreement had a definite effect on the subsequent development of U.S.-Canadian military-industrial cooperation. Canadian industry gained access to the American market, and the United States gained access to the huge reserves of Canadian strategic raw materials.

An important page in the history of Canadian-American military-industrial cooperation was written in peacetime, in 1950, when the sides agreed that "the economic efforts of the two countries will be coordinated for the purpose of joint defense, and their industry and resources will be used to the greatest common advantage."² One of the main results of the 1950 agreements was the creation of the North American Air (Aerospace since 1981) Defense Command (NORAD)—essentially the most important event in Canadian-American military and political relations. It was the final step in the formation of the military alliance of the two countries and a turning point in Canadian history. The establishment of the United States as the main "defender and guarantor of Canada's security" considerably undermined Canada's ability to conduct an independent military policy.

The result, as Canadian experts admit, was a situation in which any change in U.S. military strategy affected Canada much more than any other ally because only Canada is party to a bilateral military organization with the United States and only Canada is so closely attached to the United States in the sphere of military development and production.³

As payment for Canada's attachment to the U.S.-sponsored political and military system, Canadian firms were allowed to bid on the contracts of American military agencies at the end of 1955. The mutual commitments assumed by both countries were called "defense production sharing arrangements." The defense production sharing program was different from earlier agreements because the United States began to buy goods from Canada to satisfy all of its military needs, and not only goods for continental defense.

Table 1. Canadian-American Trade Within Joint Military Production Framework, in billions of Canadian dollars

Years	American purchases in Canada	Canadian purchases in United States	Total turnover
1959-1985	11.3	12.9	24.1
Breakdown			
1959-1978	4.4	4.8	9.2
1979-1983	3.9	4.7	8.6
1984	1.4	1.7	3.1
1985	1.6	1.7	3.3

Source: CANADIAN DIMENSION, September/October 1985, pp 17-18; THE FINANCIAL POST, 12 April 1986; 1 December 1986.

The 1959 agreements covered many aspects of Canadian-American cooperation, laid the foundation of the

mechanism of North American military-industrial integration, and essentially became (with the addition of the agreements of 1963) a major intergovernmental agreement defining all subsequent integration processes.

The U.S. Government announced that it would not extend the "Buy American" principle to the products of Canadian military industry; it would cancel import duties on the main categories of goods produced by Canadian firms acting as the subcontractors of American suppliers of military equipment; it would relax the rules of confidentiality for the discussion of the possibilities of cooperation by interested Canadian producers with the U.S. Armed Forces and American general contractors.

The Canadian Government declared that it would guarantee the permanent provision of the purchasing agencies of the American military establishment with detailed information about Canadian production capabilities; it would assist Canadian producers in maintaining the necessary technological and qualitative level of military production. Four years later, in 1963, this program was supplemented with agreements (in the form of a program) on joint military research and development projects.

These programs were concerned primarily with the processing branches of industry and did not include deliveries of the main crude resources, fuel and lubricants or transportation, communication, equipment repair and maintenance services and some types of scientific and technical cooperation. In addition to these, there are now around 20 different agreements and accords regulating American-Canadian military trade and reinforcing the economic foundation of the continental military alliance. In particular, one such agreement gives Canada access to classified information about the activity of the purchasing agencies of the American military departments. By the terms of other agreements, Canada is the only U.S. ally to be given the same priority rights as the Pentagon's main American suppliers in purchases of scarce products for military use or of strategic resources and materials.

The rapid growth of military trade between the two countries in the 1980's has been due, on the one hand, to Canada's extensive rearming program, primarily with purchases of American military equipment (mainly aviation), and on the other, to the recent enhancement of the potential of the Canadian military industry. Another important factor is the pledge by both countries in the special agreements of 1963 to maintain an approximate balance in reciprocal exports and imports of military equipment.

The agreements of 1959 and 1963 on cooperation in military production marked the beginning of the creation of common market for military products in North

America, serving as the central link of Canadian-American military-economic integration. The creation of this market put Canadian military industry on the road of specialization in the production of individual parts and components of the military equipment produced by American firms. The other side of this specialization was Canada's firm attachment to the American arms market, where it purchases most of the weapons systems it needs.

It must be said, however, that Canadian military industry has considerable potential and is capable of quickly organizing the manufacture of such products as supersonic fighter planes, which it produced on American licenses in the 1960's. Canada produces light and medium military transport planes, helicopters, armored vehicles, and modern communication and command equipment.

The more intensive cooperation within the NATO framework and the development of Atlantic integration have not led to any significant reorientation of U.S.-Canadian military-industrial cooperation from the North American to the West European market yet. For example, in comparison with the 1959-1979 period, the U.S. share of Canadian military exports had increased from 87 to 96 percent by the middle of this decade (in 1985).⁴ Canada accounts for up to half of U.S. military purchases from NATO countries.⁵ It is indicative that Canada's share of American imports of these commodities is 2-2.5 times as great as its share of bilateral trade in general (Canada accounts for only one-fifth of all U.S. imports).

The development of trade in weapons has been accompanied by the increasing intermingling of the private capital of the two countries, invested in military production. These processes, however, are mainly onesided. Although some Canadian military firms have acquired their own branches and subsidiaries on U.S. territory in recent years, the main direction of capital migration in military production is still from the United States to Canada.

The absolute majority of American military-industrial corporations have subsidiaries or branches in Canada. In particular, an analysis of the lists of the Pentagon's 100 top suppliers indicates that two-thirds have at least one Canadian company, and the subsidiaries of one out of every three are on the list of the 500 largest Canadian corporations.

Companies controlled by third countries have also played an important role in the formation of the Canadian component of the continental military-industrial base. Most of these are affiliates of English firms and enterprises controlled by Dutch, Swiss, and West German capital. The main reason for their organization of military production on Canadian territory is the most-favored-nation status of Canadian suppliers bidding on U.S. Defense Department contracts.

Other spheres of military-economic integration also exist: in particular, the creation of a common North American military-strategic infrastructure—i.e., the construction of a network of highways, railways, airfields, military bases, and other facilities, the creation and maintenance of unified communication and early warning systems, and the joint operation and modernization of radar stations in the NORAD system. An important role is also played by the joint tests of weapons, which are conducted in accordance with an agreement signed by the United States and Canada in 1984 and which also require an economic base.

Canadian Contribution to Integration

American-Canadian military-economic integration is being developed in several fields, and Canada is contributing to the buildup of U.S. military strength in each of them. The main ones are the unification of the mineral resource potential of the two countries (actually signifying the inclusion of Canadian strategic resources in the American military industry), military-industrial cooperation proper, and joint military research and development.

The intensive military preparations of the United States, including the creation of strategic reserves and the satisfaction of the daily needs of military-industrial firms for dozens of types of scarce industrial resources, would be impossible without reliable sources. The United States has rich natural resources, but they are not enough to cover all of the country's needs for many types. Guaranteed access to Canadian resources, however, strengthens American strategic potential considerably.

Canada is the leader among the foreign sources of strategic raw materials for the American economy. It is the United States' main foreign supplier of asbestos, cesium, aluminum, nickel, cadmium, gallium, titanium ore, silver, zinc, tungsten, gold, and iron ore. Exports of niobium, platinum, antimony, vanadium, silicon, and many other ores and metals also play an important role.

According to American experts, U.S. defensive potential is critically dependent on deliveries of approximately 20 types of crude minerals, with imports covering more than 90 percent of the need for 7 and more than 50 percent of the need for 13. Besides this, reserves of 23 of the 61 crude resources on the strategic reserve list are less than 50 percent of the specified quantity. The resources in both cases are such minerals as nickel, tantalum, cobalt, and metals of the platinum group, and Canada is a major exporter of these.⁶

Canada has one of the five uranium ore refineries in the capitalist world (another two are in the United States, and England and France have one apiece), where Canadian uranium and much of the uranium from Australia and South Africa are refined. The country exports 85

percent of the uranium mined there. Canada has also become the largest supplier of the tritium hydrogen isotope to the world market.

By the terms of a U.S.-Canadian agreement, Canadian radioactive materials are not supposed to be used in the production of nuclear weapons, but it is violated constantly. In 1983, for example, American officials admitted that radioactive materials from the Canadian reactor in Chalk River were being used in the production of nuclear weapons in an American company in Savannah (South Carolina).⁷ But even in cases of the formal observance of the agreement, Canadian deliveries serve

arms production indirectly. A Canadian tritium exporter, the Ontario Hydro Corporation, for example, agreed to take over the civilian contracts which had been signed earlier by an American military enterprise in Oak Ridge. By encouraging all non-military consumers of nuclear materials to import them from Canada, the Pentagon makes production capacities available for the work on its nuclear rearming plans,⁸ the CANADIAN TRIBUNE remarked.

Canadian enterprises in the processing branches of industry, especially electronics and aerospace, are playing an increasingly prominent role in deliveries of products for U.S. military needs (see Table 2).

Table 2. Sectorial Structure of Canadian Military Exports

Branches	Total exports 1959-1984		Exports to United States 1984	
	Millions of dollars	%	Millions of dollars	%
Total	13,393	100	1,361	100
Breakdown				
Aerospace	5,862	43.8	416	30.6
Electronics and electrical equipment	4,333	32.3	450	33.1
Shipbuilding	901	6.7	97	7.1
Transport machine building	1,109	8.3	295	21.7
Firearm and ammunition production	936	7.0	75	5.5
Other	252	1.9	27	2.0

Source: CANADIAN DIMENSION, September/October 1985, p 18;
THE PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR, December 1985, pp 12-13.

A distinctive feature of military production in Canada is its high concentration. Virtually all of the military products used in the country and exported come from 200-300 firms. Furthermore, the number exporting their products to the United States on a regular basis is even lower. In 1985, for example, all military shipments for Pentagon contracts were made by only 124 companies.⁹ For many of them the American market is virtually their only source of income. The Canadian aerospace industry is particularly dependent on the United States. It sells four-fifths of its products on the foreign market, including 60 percent to the United States.

The radioelectronics industry is another important source of military exports to the United States. Canada supplies the United States and other NATO countries with sonars, magnetometers, and guided beacons, produced by Westinghouse Canada, CAE Electronics, and Spartan of Canada; computerized command, control, communication, and intelligence systems, the leaders in the production of which are Liston Systems Canada, Westinghouse Canada, and Computing Devices (an affiliate of the American Control Data firm).¹⁰

In the near future the production of infrared radar systems will apparently become another major field of specialization in the Canadian radioelectronics industry.

Spar Aerospace has stayed far ahead of the competition in the development of these (since the beginning of the 1960's).¹¹ Another area of Spar Aerospace operations—the production of robot engineering systems (remote control devices for American space ships) and space communications equipment—is also becoming one of the fields of national specialization.

The Canadian military industry participates in the U.S. production of offensive weapons and military equipment designed for armed aggression, such as armored troop carriers and the C-5 Galaxy transport planes for the "rapid deployment forces."

It is also significant that although Canada has no American nuclear weapons within its territory, Canadian firms participate directly in their production through cooperative agreements. For example, according to the well-known peace organization, Project Orala, more than 10 Canadian companies are now suppliers of the components of key American nuclear weapons systems and the means of their delivery (see Table 3). Even more participate in the production of around 20 types of American military equipment capable of serving as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons—airplanes, helicopters, naval ships, and missile artillery equipment.

Table 3. Participation by Canadian Firms in Development of Nuclear Weapons Systems and Delivery Vehicles

Weapons systems	Name of firm	Components produced
Air-based cruise missiles	Litton Systems Canada	Navigation systems
Strategic B-1B bomber	Haley Industries	Precision cast nonferrous metals
B-52 bomber	Gabriel of Canada	Spare parts
	Garrett Manufacturing	Temperature control systems
Tomahawk Sea- and land-based missiles	Litton Systems Canada	Navigation systems
	Canadian Commercial	...
MX missiles	Boeing of Canada	Structural elements for warheads
	Ebco Industries	...
Trident submarines	Automation Tooling Systems	...
	Versatile Vickers	Structural elements of hull, torpedoes, and ICBM launchers

Source: THE PLOUGHSHARES MONITOR, December 1986, pp 22-23.

In this way, a highly developed military-technological base has been established and constantly improved in Canada through the efforts of, on the one hand, the United States and its military-industrial corporations and, on the other, several national firms with all-round assistance from the government. It has been placed at the service of its "senior partner" in integration and represents an important factor in the reinforcement of its strategic potential. This is attested to specifically by the fact that the list of the 9,538 military firms subject to mobilization, in accordance with the U.S. Defense Department plans of 1981, on the orders of the American Government includes 145 Canadian military-industrial companies,¹² which is a unique acknowledgement by the United States of their "services" in the sphere of military production.

Driving Forces and Conflicts

The formation of the American-Canadian military-industrial complex has primarily taken the form of the attachment of Canadian industry to the U.S. strategic industrial base and the integration of Canadian military policy with U.S. strategic doctrine. Because of significant differences in the potential of the two countries, Canada is unable to exert any serious influence on the integration processes, but these processes can only be described as something imposed on Canada by the American side in a few respects, because the goals pursued by the United States and Canada have a common class basis.

The tendency toward the formation of a single military-industrial complex in North America has not acquired its final form. An analysis of the main driving forces of the integration processes, however, aids in defining several of its salient features. American military-industrial corporations are the main driving force of a regional military-industrial complex because they have a direct interest in larger Pentagon purchases of military products and in an increase in the Canadian Government's military expenditures. In the present system of closely interwoven capital and close industrial, scientific, and technical cooperation in the military sphere, they can

derive profits regardless of the geographic location of the military contracts of the Canadian Ministry of National Defense. Even if the contracts are awarded in Canada instead of the United States, more than half of them will go to corporations in which American capital has at least a 70- percent share.¹³

Canadian military firms have also been active in supporting the development of U.S.-Canadian integration. The overwhelming majority have a monopoly on the production of individual military products and most of them have a unique technology and a modern technical base. These firms have superior competitive potential, but they need a market as large and stable as the American one for the optimization of their production. Besides this, in most cases they are simply unable to find another consumer of their highly specialized products.

For example, a Canadian association of aerospace industrialists sent a policy statement to the government in 1983 on a development strategy for the Canadian aerospace industry, demanding the complete elimination of all restrictions on Canadian-American trade and advising maximum Canadian participation in American and NATO programs for the development of new weapons.¹⁴ A special research group on foreign affairs and defense of the Business Council on National Issues, Canadian big business' most influential organization, went even further. In its opinion, the country does not have a stable and trustworthy military policy and "is virtually unable to defend itself."¹⁵

American military and political leaders have also displayed considerable interest in the development of the military-economic and military-political integration of the United States and Canada, leading to the creation of a single North American military-industrial complex. The Canadian military industry, which is completely dependent on the U.S. military-industrial complex, is necessary to the United States as a guarantee of Canada's submission to American diktat in the sphere of joint continental defense. Besides this, on the political level, Canada's participation in U.S. military preparations allows the American administration to "share responsibility" for its aggressive policy line and for starting an

arms race of unprecedented dimensions. The development of integration will give American military circles a chance to direct the establishment of a reserve military-industrial and raw material base on Canadian territory. By keeping it in a state of heightened readiness, to which end important Pentagon contracts are constantly turned over to Canadian firms, the American strategists will be able to view Canada as an integral part of their mobilization base whenever necessary.

The Canadian Government is also quite interested in deeper military-economic integration and has remained loyal to the continental approach to military-strategic issues even during periods of severe Canadian-American conflicts. The statement that American contracts provide jobs for thousands of Canadians is an important part of the government propaganda about the economic advantages of military cooperation with the United States. For example, defense contracts pay the wages of 16.5 percent of the people employed in the Canadian aerospace industry, 28 percent in shipbuilding, and from 3 to 5 percent in the chemical industry and branches of communications.¹⁶ If the money were to be used for purely civilian purposes, however, each billion dollars allocated for military needs could, according to the estimates of peace organizations, provide jobs for 2.5 times as many Canadians in medicine or in education and 4 times as many in such branches as municipal transport or postal communications.¹⁷ The Ottawa government, however, does not want to take these arguments into consideration because the use of trade in military products to stimulate economic development has become an integral part of the economic policy of the Canadian state.

The development of the North American military-industrial complex is converging and consolidating the positions of militarist circles in the United States and Canada. One result of this is the invariable support of the American military establishment's efforts to build up its military strength by influential Canadian politicians and businessmen with a vital interest in new American contracts. Besides this, the direct ties between militarist groups in the United States and the Canadian military-economic and political elite are compensating Canada to some extent for the traditionally weaker influence of its military leadership on the upper echelons of government than the Pentagon's influence in U.S. politics.

The more intensive exchange of personnel between American military-industrial corporations and the Canadian military leadership is one of the features of the regional military-industrial complex and an element of its internal mechanism. For example, a former high-level employee of the Canadian Ministry of National Defense who was responsible for the purchase of new fighter planes for the Canadian Air Force (for a total of 5 billion dollars) now has a job with the McDonnell-Douglas corporation, the final victor in the bidding for this contract.¹⁸

The distinct orientation of Canadian Government undertakings in the sphere of military production to Pentagon needs is a characteristic example of U.S.-Canadian military-economic cooperation. Suffice it to say that the main government program in this sphere (the program to enhance the effectiveness of military production) was conceived from the very start as a means of improving the quality of military products sent to the United States. Between 1969 and 1985 (the work on the program actually began in 1959), expenditures on the program totaled 1.24 billion dollars, and just five firms received almost three-fifths of this sum. It is indicative that only one of them is a Canadian company and belongs to the federal government, while the rest are branches of American firms.¹⁹

The formation of a single American-Canadian military-industrial complex, however, has been a contradictory process. The cooperation of military-industrial monopolies in the two countries has been free of conflict only wherever and whenever it has been mutually beneficial. The intensification of integration processes has given rise to serious conflicts between partners and new limiting factors. In contrast to many other spheres of American-Canadian relations, however, the development of military-political coordination has been accompanied by vigorous regulating activity by the governments of the United States and Canada, and this has averted, at least to date, all serious conflicts of interest capable of stopping and reversing the processes of military-economic integration.

The Canadian Government's position on military cooperation with the United States has been influenced seriously by public opinion and by the growth of the antinuclear and antiwar movement in Canada in recent years. One important reason for this growth is the ability of the Pentagon to make use of the integration mechanism to force Canada to agree to certain military undertakings against its national interests and official position, particularly participation in the production and testing of American nuclear weapons.

Washington's protectionist measures are seriously impeding the development of military-economic integration in North America. In spite of the special nature of U.S.-Canadian relations, the fierce competition between the military-industrial corporations of the two countries for Pentagon contracts inevitably leads to new attempts by American firms to urge the government to protect their interests.

The U.S. attempts to revise the compensatory system of transactions could also have far-reaching consequences. The requirement that American corporations provide, in exchange for purchases of their military equipment, Canadian companies with contracts of equivalent value was already being discussed in the U.S. Congress at the beginning of the 1980's. The prevailing opinion there was that Canada was deriving too much benefit from these transactions.

It would also be difficult to list all of the negative effects of the new rules of confidentiality with regard to American military-technical information, including the regulations governing the work on the SDI, on the development of bilateral military-economic cooperation. Finally, Washington is also irritated by the priority the Canadian Government always assigns to economic advantages in the sphere of bilateral military relations and its obvious avoidance of the role of choir leader in the military-political campaigns initiated by the American administration.

Therefore, although the distinctive features of the military-political system in Canada have prevented the complete establishment of an independent military-industrial complex of the American type, some of its elements are nevertheless now functioning as part of the U.S. military-industrial complex. Canada is being paid for its denial of its genuine national interests with access to the large American market for its military industry and with lucrative Pentagon contracts. This kind of pragmatic approach has occupied a central place in the set of Canadian foreign policy concepts of recent years. This approach is probably one of the main reasons for the Conservative leadership's persistence in building up Canada's military strength. In a defense program ("White Paper") published in 1987, the Conservative government proposed the expenditure of 200 billion Canadian dollars in the next 15 years to rearm the country. More and more Canadians, however, support the new way of thinking and the realistic approach to world political issues. This consists in the realization that, as Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs D. Roach aptly remarked, East-West relations are now built on arms reduction, and not on arms buildup.

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Impact of Congressional Elections on White House Policy Viewed

18030002e Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 87 (signed to press 17 Sep 87) pp 74-78

[Article by Ye.M. Veremyeva: "Congress and the White House"]

[Text] The first moves of the 100th Congress proved that the predictions of more tense relations between the White House and the Capitol were true. The word "veto" appeared on the pages of the American press. And it was not only the presidential veto (or prohibition), which had already been imposed on two bills and had been overridden by a second vote in Congress, but

also the "veto strategy" with which the administration armed itself, because its support from the legislators grew much weaker after the 1986 elections and the "Irangate" events.

The first conflict took place when R. Reagan vetoed a clean water bill. It was overridden by both houses of Congress.

The second presidential veto was imposed at the end of March 1987 on a highway development bill. This bill, allocating 88 billion dollars for the construction, repair, and maintenance of the nation's highways, is not an epoch-making event in itself. It will finance around 100 large-scale county and state highway projects, and this was the reason for its energetic support in the Capitol. In spite of this and against the recommendations of some advisers, the administration called the bill "wasteful" and launched a campaign against it, turning the results of the coming vote into a test of strength and political influence in the Capitol. Before the vote, Reagan made a speech, banking on the prestige of the presidency and the personal charm that had served him so faultlessly in the past. The result of all of these efforts was a crushing defeat for Reagan in the Senate, where the President's veto was overridden by a vote of 67 to 33.

This test of strength, which was organized by the administration itself, provided more vivid proof of the President's weaker position on Capitol Hill. Another peculiarity of the current phase of relations between the executive and legislative branches also became evident: The lack of correspondence between Reagan's unyielding, "ideologized" position and the approach of Congress, which demands more flexible and realistic decisions on several political problems, is a source of friction.

The administration's plans for the continued buildup of American military presence in the Persian Gulf aroused considerable anxiety. The legislators were alarmed by the threat of U.S. involvement in the Iran-Iraq conflict. The leader of the Democratic majority in the Senate, R. Byrd (West Virginia), called the plans for the Persian Gulf a "half-baked, poorly planned operation" with which the United States hoped to demonstrate its strength after the "Iran-Contra" scandal. This is a sign of bad policy and overconfidence,¹ he said.

The position taken by the Reagan Administration proved that the White House does not want to make concessions, and this could lead to an extremely fierce confrontation in the future, especially in view of the upcoming discussion of the draft federal budget for fiscal year 1988 and the extremely complex problem of the budget deficit.

In April 1987 the House of Representatives had already approved (by a vote of 230 to 192) a draft budget of 1.1 trillion dollars. It envisaged the reduction of the deficit and an increase in taxes. The draft reduced Reagan's proposed SDI budget of 5.2 billion dollars to 3.3 billion.²

The Democrats won the first round of the struggle over the future budget by pushing this draft through the House. Virtually all of the provisions of the draft, including the increase in some taxes, the freeze on military expenditures, and the cancellation of cuts in social spending, have been proposed, with minor variations, in all drafts of recent years. The Democrats' draft budgets of this year and past years were drawn up from a centrist, moderate-conservative standpoint. They reflect the budget priorities of the dominant group of centrists and moderate conservatives in the Democratic Party leadership and congressional committees.

The Senate budget reflected even more moderate views but was based on the same principles as the House budget. The budget proposed by the Reagan Administration was rejected by an overwhelming majority in the Senate and the House.

The congressional drafts were an indication of the increasingly diverging views of the White House and the Capitol on budget matters; furthermore, there are conflicts of a fundamental nature in the sphere of fiscal policy. After all, Reagan repeatedly said that he would veto any bill raising taxes, but whereas the Democrats were not strong enough 2 years ago to push their own budgets through both houses and enter into a battle with the administration, the 1986 elections gave them a majority of seats in the Senate and strengthened opposition potential.

The election results also influenced Congress' approach to arms control, to Reagan's policy in Nicaragua, to the creation of the costly ABM system with space-based elements, and to other military and foreign policy issues.

In the Senate the Democrats now hold 54 seats³ and the Republicans hold 46, and the respective figures in the House are 258 and 177. The election results reflected the tendency toward the erosion of Reagan's political base in Congress. These changes, however, cannot be viewed in isolation from the complicated process of the regrouping of political forces in the Capitol since the end of the 1970's, including a shift toward conservatism, the reinforcement of the ultra-rightwing bloc of legislators in the Republican faction, and a period of crisis for liberal Democrats.

Between 1980 and 1982 the Republicans, who had won the majority of Senate seats for the first time since 1952, were able to secure support for Reagan's legislative program. Between 1982 and 1986 this process seemed to lose its momentum, and the ultra-conservative bloc ceased to grow. In the House of Representatives, where the Democrats retained the majority even at the height of Reagan's success, the erosion of the administration's influence began even earlier. As the first steps of the 100th Congress proved, the House of Representatives, where the elections brought about minimal changes (the Democrats won another five seats), was still the opposition stronghold. The House opposed the administration

on most of the important bills put to a vote in 1987. It demanded a freeze on the allocation of 40 million dollars for aid to the Nicaraguan contras, advocated a 1-year moratorium on tests of nuclear devices of over a kiloton in force as long as the USSR did the same, and passed amendments obligating the administration to observe the numerical limits of the SALT II treaty and adhere to the traditional interpretation of the ABM treaty.

As for the Senate, for 6 years it was the administration's main pillar of support and successfully neutralized the moderate opposition in the House of Representatives. A standard scenario of political confrontation took shape during these years, in which all actions by the Democratic opposition were nullified in Senate and House conference committees, where compromises were reached under pressure from the White House.

Last year's midterm elections were the last election campaign during Reagan's presidency. No matter what happens in the future, they confirmed that the administration's political base in Congress had been shrinking like pebbled leather during its years in the White House each time the President had tried to carry out his program. By the end of this period, Reagan's agenda was exhausted and his influence in Congress was demolished. After the 1986 elections and "Irangate," the Republican administration entered the politically difficult period of "divided rule" between the White House and the Congress. It was then that the "veto strategy" was chosen as one of the weapons in the executive branch's battles with the legislators.

A White House strategy held in reserve entails the use of the conservative coalition in the Senate to promote administration undertakings and block actions by the Democratic opposition. Furthermore, the President's advisers hope to use conservative southern Democrats for this purpose.

The "veto strategy" presupposes the relative unity of the Republican Senate faction, guaranteeing the administration the votes of 34 senators (this is the precise number required to uphold a veto; as we know, it is overridden only by two-thirds of the vote in both houses). The highway construction bill was the touchstone used in judging the effectiveness of this strategy. It turned out that the assumption of a monolithic Republican faction in the Senate was unfounded: 13 Republican senators voted with the Democrats to override the veto, and many of them were conservatives. This split was a comparatively new phenomenon. Until recently the Republicans in the Senate demonstrated definite unity; the opposition group of moderate Republicans headed by L. Weicker (Connecticut) was small, consisting of only four or five senators: M. Hatfield (Oregon), R. Stafford (Vermont), W. Cohen (Maine), and J. Chafee (Rhode Island).

It had been assumed that the main threat to Republican unity was posed by the ultra-rightwing legislators, who constantly threatened a break with the White House leadership if Reagan should begin making concessions, especially in fiscal matters. This possibility still exists and the administration has to take it into account. The threat to Republican unity posed by moderates was a comparatively new phenomenon. It could mean new difficulties for Reagan, especially in the upcoming struggle over the budget.

Serious problems also arose in connection with the attempts to use the conservative coalition as the administration's political base in the Senate. In March 1987 Congress was supposed to authorize the allocation of 40 million dollars in aid to the Nicaraguan contras; this was part of the 100 million dollars earmarked for them in 1986. In connection with "Irangate," as mentioned above, the Democrats proposed a freeze on the next transfer of 40 million dollars until all of the facts concerning the use of previously transferred funds, including the proceeds from arms sales to Iran, had been disclosed. The House of Representatives voted for the freeze (230 to 196). The Senate authorized the allocation of the funds (52 to 48).

How did this happen? After all, the Democrats, who made the decision to freeze the funds, control the Senate. The reason was another split, as a result of which 14 southern Democrats voted against their own party line, joining the Republicans in their support of the contra aid bill. In other words, a conservative coalition was formed. Its members included newly elected southern Democrats J. Breaux (Louisiana), R. Graham (Florida), R. Shelby (Alabama), and T. Sanford (North Carolina).

The allocation of the 40 million dollars was opposed by 40 Democrats and 8 Republicans, who lost this fight to the conservatives.

"The results of the vote," Senator R. Byrd, Democratic majority leader, said, "are not a victory for the administration in Central America. They are an a-arm bell and an indication of doubts about administration policy."⁴ The opinion of Senator R. Dole, Republican minority leader, was not much different: "To be honest, those of us who supported contra aid did not do a very good thing."⁵ The unanimous opinion is that Reagan's new request for 105 million dollars for the contras will get a hostile reception in Congress.

We should recall that in 1986 the conservative coalition, according to the data of the CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY research service, was victorious in virtually all altercations leading to its formation. The conservative coalition took shape during votes on bills concerned mainly with aid to the contras, military appropriations, arms trade controls, and several other matters. The vote in the Senate this year on the 40 million dollars proved that the conservative coalition still has considerable potential, especially in the Senate.

Among the many factors determining the Senate's position in the near future, the political characteristics of newly elected senators warrant discussion.

In all, 11 new Democrats and 2 Republicans were elected to the Senate in 1986. Most of them came from the House of Representatives, allowing for the fairly precise definition of their political position. The newly elected Democrats are an extremely heterogeneous group. They include conservative southerners, traditional liberals, and politicians whose views could be described as centrist.

Both of the new Republicans, C. Bond (Missouri) and J. McCain (Arizona), are extremely conservative politicians.

The newly elected Democrats include such traditional liberals as B. Mikulski (Maryland), representative of the new technocratic current in the party majority T. Wirth (Colorado), populist Democrat K. Conrad (North Dakota), and southern Democrats R. Shelby, R. Graham, and J. Breaux. The press is keeping an eye on the group of new southern Democrats; commentaries predicted that stronger southern representation could strengthen the position of the conservative coalition, and it is true that some of the new senators from the southern states are taking the conservative position.

When R. Shelby was a member of the House of Representatives, he voted for the full-scale production of the MX missile, the SDI, and the testing of antisatellite weapons and voted against all cuts in military spending. For several years (from 1978 to 1986) he invariably supported the administration's economic policy.

J. Breaux is Senator R. Long's successor in the full sense of the term. He inherited Long's close ties with oil companies and refining corporations, the political sympathies of which are known to be particularly reactionary. When Breaux was a congressman, he was part of the group of the so-called "boll weevils" (southerners) and voted along with R. Shelby against his own party line in support of the current administration's economic program. There is hardly any doubt that Breaux will remain conservative in the Senate and will support all militarist projects with the greatest enthusiasm.

R. Graham occupies a special position in the southern group because he is a member of the new generation of politicians representing a more flexible and pragmatic form of conservatism. He came to the Senate from the governor's mansion in Florida, which he had occupied since 1978, and was a member of the state legislature prior to this. He is a member of the Council for Democratic Leadership, which was founded in 1985 and unites politicians connecting the future of the party with the south.

This is the conservative flank of the new Democrats. All of them took the place of conservative politicians and did not make any appreciable changes in the overall balance of power in the Senate.

The election of a large group of centrist Democrats from the southern and western states—T. Daschle (South Dakota), K. Conrad, W. Fowler (Georgia), T. Sanford, B. Adams (Washington), and H. Reid (Nevada)—was a sign of the times. The centrist group they joined reflects the main contradictions in the Democratic camp in the 1980's. This group occupies a position midway between the traditional liberals (B. Mikulski and T. Wirth) and the conservative southerners without joining either. It was this group, however, that broke through the Republican front and secured a perceptible shift toward the center in the overall range of political forces in the Senate. These senators concentrated on local problems in their campaigns and did not discuss such traditional matters as their relationship to the Washington bureaucracy, "big government," etc.

The new centrist Democrats are distinguished by a departure from liberal positions and a shift to the right in matters of domestic and foreign policy. For example, when Senator W. Fowler was a member of the House of Representatives from a district where 65 percent of the population is black, he voted as a liberal; during his Senate campaign, however, he moved quickly toward the center and chose his colleague S. Nunn, an extremely influential conservative legislator from the same state, as his model. In the House of Representatives Fowler supported the freeze on USSR and U.S. nuclear arsenals and opposed the production of the MX missile and the financing of the contras.

T. Daschle's position on economic issues is often contradictory, but on other issues he votes as a liberal. Daschle is a confirmed opponent of the SDI; in 1985 and 1986 he voted against the MX missile and the allocations for the production of binary nerve gas and supported the ban on tests of antisatellite weapons and all amendments envisaging cuts in military expenditures for fiscal year 1987.

In contrast to Daschle, H. Reid is the only new Democratic senator to support the SDI. His approach to other issues is distinguished by the characteristic moderation of centrists and is even colored by a slight touch of liberalism. Reid opposed the allocations for binary weapons and voted for the ban on tests of antisatellite weapons and for the observance of SALT II treaty limits. When he was a congressman he voted against allocations for the Nicaraguan contras and supported the Contadora Group's efforts to restore peace in Central America.

As for the liberal flank, the views of new Democratic senators T. Wirth and B. Mikulski are well known because they occupy a prominent position in their party and in Congress. As confirmed opponents of the arms race, they voted in the House for the reduction of the

Pentagon budget for FY 1987, the observance of the SALT II treaty, the ban on tests of antisatellite weapons against targets in space, the SDI, and binary weapons.

An analysis of the alignment of forces in the American Congress indicates that the greater strength of the Democrats is primarily due to the centrist group of senators and represents neither a "liberal revolution" nor a victory for the conservative flank. The current political situation in the Congress is ambiguous. It is much more favorable for the Democrats than before, but the majority the party now holds does not seem strong enough and does not always guarantee support for the party leadership's line. There is no doubt, however, that the general shift to the center in the political spectrum of the Congress has intensified the anti-Reagan opposition and aggravated relations between the legislative and executive branches on the threshold of the 1988 election campaign.

Footnotes

1. THE WASHINGTON POST, 17 June 1987.
2. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 4-5 April 1987.
3. The balance of power in the Senate changed from 55:45 after the elections to 54:46 after the death of Democratic Senator E. Zorinsky (Nebraska), in whose place the governor of the state appointed Republican D. Karnes.
4. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 19 March 1987.
5. Ibid.

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Prospects for U.S. Space Program Reviewed
18030002f Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 87 (signed to press 17 Sep 87) pp 93-98

[Article by V.T. Khorkov: "Prospects for Astronautics, American Model"]

[Text] The report "Pioneering the Space Frontier,"¹ a program of civilian activity in space in coming decades, is still being discussed by Western scientists, the public, and the business community. This report, which was prepared for the President and Congress by the National Commission on Space, was published in book form at the end of last year. It was dedicated to the seven crew members who died in the "Challenger" disaster in January 1986.

Summing up the results of earlier activity in space and examining its prospects for the coming half-century, the authors of the report express the certainty that "an active civilian space program will be an integral part of 21st-century America. It will aid in the establishment of industrial enterprises in space, will advance science, and will uphold the United States' technological leadership among its rivals, whose professional mastery and ambitions are constantly growing."²

The global nature of the issue of space exploration and the tremendous potential opportunities afforded by the use of space technology for the resolution of urgent problems forced the Republican administration to consider the prospects for the development of civilian astronautics and possible forms of U.S. influence on the development of world astronautics as an important field of scientific and technical progress.

At the beginning of 1985 President Reagan appointed a National Commission on Space and requested it to draw up an agenda for civilian activity in space. The 15 members of the commission included politicians, military experts, renowned American scientists, and astronauts. It was headed by Thomas Payne, former NASA director (he was the president of the Northrop corporation). His deputy, Doctor Laurel Wilkening, is an astronomer and a dean of Arizona State University. The members also included astronaut Neil Armstrong, member of the Apollo-11 crew and participant in the first moon landing; astronaut Kathryn Sullivan, the first American woman to venture into space; Jeane Kirkpatrick, former permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations and professor at Georgetown University; retired generals William Fitch, Charles Eager, and Bernard Shriver (he headed the U.S. Air Force ballistic missiles and military space systems development projects in the 1950's and 1960's); Paul Coleman, professor at the University of California and director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (known to be one of the main SDI executors).

The National Commission on Space proposed a program envisaging the broader study of the earth, the solar system, and the universe; the study, exploration, and colonization of the solar system; the encouragement of space enterprise for the direct benefit of the earth's population.

In addition, the report has several political features. For example, the guarantee of "American leadership on the space frontier" is called one of the goals of the program at the very beginning of the report. It openly asserts that "the Americans are the ones to direct mankind in the exploration of space." The United States intends to gear its space activity to the "colonization of worlds beyond our planet" (the entire solar system is declared to be a home for mankind) and to the "discovery of new

resources." The report lists several basic scientific topics in which space research can contribute much. Most of them were discussed in Congress in fall 1985,³ including the following:

What laws of nature govern the universe? More precisely, what laws govern its birth and development, including such grand phenomena as the formation of galaxies, neutron stars, and black holes? How are stars and planets formed? How were the sun, the planets with satellites, and the small bodies of the solar system formed? How did they evolve? Why are the gigantic planets so different from the planets like the earth?

How does the energy in the interior of the sun break through the core and enter interplanetary space? How does it interact with the planets? How does solar energy change? Is this the reason for the Ice Age and other changes in the earth's climate?

What are the composition and structure of the earth's interior and crust and what is the dynamic of the processes occurring within it? How were these layers formed and how did they evolve? What is the source of the earth's magnetic field?

What are the structure and chemical composition of the oceans, the atmosphere, and the polar ice caps, and what is the dynamic of the processes occurring within them? How do these components interact with the surface of the earth? Why is the atmosphere so different on Mars, the Earth, and Venus and how has it changed?

What are the origins, evolution, and distribution of life in the universe? Are we alone? What processes and interacting elements of the environment contributed to the origins of life on earth and now maintain it?

How do the planet's fauna and human activity affect the composition of the oceans, atmosphere, and crust of the earth, the dynamic of processes within them, and their evolution?

What role does gravity play in physical, chemical, and biological processes?

With a view to all of these questions, the commission recommended an active program of scientific research in space.

A national space laboratory is to be established for the efficient organization of the scientific part of the space program. It will be expected to provide the scientific complex in space with the necessary equipment and to collect, analyze, and grant selected applications for experimentation within this complex. The activities of the complex are to be financed by interested federal establishments (the National Science Foundation, the Department of Energy, and the National Institutes of Health) as well as by universities and industrial corporations.

Problems in the development of space transport systems are discussed at length in the report. The U.S. need for advanced transport vehicles, in the authors' opinion, could be satisfied by creating a safe and cheap system of transportation in space; improving the characteristics of propulsion systems to secure higher speeds in space during flights to distant objects and along complex trajectories. They propose the constant improvement of boosters and shuttles with various propulsion systems for travel in space and for the delivery of people and freight to low orbits. They recommend the assignment of priority to the development of the aerospace plane,⁴ which is considered to be extremely promising. The spacecraft is supposed to undergo flight testing in 1992. According to FORTUNE magazine, several different air-space systems (spacecraft) are being developed in the United States. The transport model will replace the space shuttle and will be able to put components of the ABM system with space-based elements, created in line with the Star Wars program, in low orbits. The cost of delivering payloads to space will apparently, according to an overly optimistic prediction, be only one-tenth as high as the cost of shuttle flights. The military model will perform the functions of a highly invulnerable reconnaissance plane or fighter-bomber, capable of reaching any spot on earth within 2 hours. The third model is a passenger liner with from 300 to 500 seats.⁵ The agencies responsible for the creation and development of all this equipment are NASA and the U.S. Defense Department.

On the practical level, the authors of the report consider the possibility of exploring space near the earth, the moon, and Mars. Permanently manned bases are to be established on the moon in the next 30 years. The study of Mars and its satellites will continue, and Martian colonies are to be organized by the 2030's.

In 1994 the United States intends to put a permanent space station into orbit to "inaugurate the era" of permanent American presence in space. A third of the cost of this station, according to the calculations of American experts, will be paid by Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. The same countries, in the authors' opinion, will contribute several key technologies for its construction. The station will be manned permanently by a crew of six people, working in 90-day shifts. Its projected service life is 30 years. The station will be used for many purposes. It will be used for research in astronomy and plasma physics, the study of the properties of various materials, and observations of the earth from space. Besides this, it will be used to test and perfect all station systems (life support systems, power generators, instruments used to observe the earth, etc.). It will serve as a spaceport for the space shuttles and special interorbital spacecraft. The station will also be used as a repair shop for satellites and space platforms.

The work of creating the station will be only one phase of the design and construction of completely autonomous manned bases intended for prolonged human presence in space. All of the conditions necessary to sustain life,

including an artificial biosphere and gravity, will be created on them. Their power supply will come either from improved solar batteries or installed nuclear systems.

These bases could serve, in particular, as spaceports, which are to be constructed in orbits near the Earth, the Moon, and Mars, and in one of the so-called Lagrange points where the gravitational force of the earth is neutralized by the moon's force. Spaceports will also be necessary as transshipment and transfer points on space routes. These ports and spacecraft will constitute the basis of the transport network that is to be created for travel within the inner portion of the solar system. The regular movement of vehicles between earth and martian orbits is to be established to facilitate the organization of flights to Mars and back, but the delivery of people and freight to these orbits and from them to the surface of the Earth and Mars will be accomplished with the aid of other spacecraft. The creation of the entire network should be complete after shuttle flights between Earth and the Moon have been organized, a system of spaceports near the Earth, the Moon, and Mars has been established, highly efficient transport for the delivery of raw materials to be processed in space has been secured, and regular space flights to Mars have been organized.

It will be the policy of the American Government to encourage extensive participation by the private sector in space exploration. In the opinion of the authors, private business will have an interest in several branches of future space industry in addition to space communications, navigation, space probes, the construction of transport vehicles, and the production of new materials in zero gravity conditions. American experts believe that one of the most promising branches is the establishment of enterprises for the collection of solar energy in space and its transmission to the earth.

The authors of the report speak of the need for the better coordination of the efforts of Congress, NASA, and other such agencies with the efforts of private corporations. With the aim of promoting this kind of cooperation and securing the direct control of the space program by the administration, they advise the restoration of the President's National Aeronautics and Space Council (which existed from 1958 to 1972 in accordance with the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958).

As for international cooperation in space, the authors feel that it "will help America reach its goals in space more quickly and cheaply. Cooperation could also create a more favorable international atmosphere for a sweeping space program carried out in line American values. We will gain much from encouraging the best minds in the world to work on our program." As far as cooperation within the United Nations and other international organizations is concerned, they recommend that "the

United States avoid entering into international agreements proposed by international organizations in which opponents have too much influence and broad powers to oversee American activity in space."

In other words, the United States intends to continue the practice of concluding bilateral agreements, to "put its partners to work" on the American space program.

The growing potential of developed capitalist countries in space science and technology, in the authors' opinion, simultaneously makes them potentially valuable partners in space activity and serious rivals. For this reason, they propose "the active encouragement of joint undertakings with the necessary consideration of mutual interests and the protection of U.S. commercial interests." In the 1980's the United States already has to admit that the West European countries are becoming a force to be reckoned with in space exploration. At first the West Europeans hoped to gain access to the latest materials and technologies as a result of their participation in joint projects with the United States, but the U.S. policy of limiting transfers of technology and technical information solely to those absolutely necessary for the compatibility of European and American technical components has clouded these hopes. For this reason, the West European countries have united their efforts and are making successful advances in the creation of independent space potential. Their activity has consisted mainly of work on communication satellites, space probes, and weather satellites. Certain hopes have also been invested in the West European Aryan rocket, although its tests have been marked by many technical malfunctions. West Europeans have displayed an interest in the production of materials in zero gravity, the transmission of energy from space, and other fields of activity.

In reference to U.S. cooperation with the developing countries, the authors of the report recommend a search for possible uses for space technology. The United States also intends to continue selling the services of its communication satellites, space probes, and navigation satellites. Besides this, cooperation with this group of countries, in the authors' opinion, will aid in the attainment of major foreign policy objectives.

As for cooperation with the Soviet Union, the authors recommend the development of "selective cooperation" in the sphere of space activity.

One section of the report deals with the socioeconomic conditions of space activity: features of technical progress, projected population growth, "geopolitical stability," and the development of the American and world economies. The authors feel it will be possible to solve all of the complex economic problems of present-day America on the strength of the "long-range viability and adaptability of the American economic system" and scientific development. According to the authors, the U.S. GNP will increase at a rate of 2.4 percent a year between 1985 and 2035. They declare that, with this rate

of economic growth, "21st-century America will be able to lead the world on the space frontier." For this purpose, they advise the annual allocation of around 0.5 percent of the GNP for space activity.

The cost of the program is estimated at 700 billion dollars.⁸ What is more, in American plans the United States is slated to pay only 75 percent of the cost. Foreign capital investments are to cover the remaining 25 percent. The past experience in soliciting foreign investments in this sphere is taken into account. Between 1958 and 1972 total expenditures on joint projects (NASA concluded around 250 agreements with 87 countries during this period) exceeded 500 million dollars, and 75 percent of the sum was covered by the United States' partners.⁹ As of 1979,¹⁰ foreign states and international organizations had paid the United States more than 2 billion dollars to put their satellites in orbit (in the preceding 15 years) and around 1.7 billion dollars for joint projects (in the preceding 19 years). Other countries also paid an impressive share in the 1980's. The construction of Spacelab by the West Europeans cost, according to a WASHINGTON POST estimate, 1 billion dollars,¹¹ and the West European countries have agreed to spend 2 billion dollars on the projected American "Columbia" space station.¹²

It is interesting that the Star Wars program is only mentioned in passing in the report. We could even assume that the program for the civilian exploration of space is viewed as an alternative to the SDI. Although efforts are being made in the United States today to give the SDI program an irreversible nature, we feel that the possibility of its partial completion or even its abandonment at some time in the future cannot be excluded. In this case, the civilian program could replace SDI because it also has the aim of winning and maintaining U.S. leadership in the sphere of space activity and of attaching the allies more closely to the United States and thereby eliminating them as rivals. Therefore, we can see that if we disregard purely military aspects, several of the economic, technical, technological, and even political goals of SDI are to be attained through the work on this civilian program.

There is an apparent battle going on in the United States today over the future of astronautics: Should its development take the civilian or the militarist route in coming years? The very appearance of the report by the President's commission is a result of the struggle NASA is waging for its own survival, to prevent a takeover by the Pentagon. The agency needed this kind of large-scale and long-range program of space activity to consolidate its position. The program also has serious opponents, primarily military, and NASA apparently still has to make a serious effort to defend it and to guarantee its execution. We must not forget that this is not an official program yet, but only a set of recommendations, with which many people in the United States disagree. Only time will tell which side will win the tug of war. In any case, it will be a difficult compromise.

The future of astronautics will depend largely on the state of international relations. The Soviet peace initiatives of 15 January 1986, the proposal put forth at the 27th CPSU Congress on the creation of a comprehensive system of international security, the "Star Peace" program, the proposal on the creation of a world space organization, and several other USSR moves could definitely help in creating the necessary atmosphere so that the achievements of world astronautics would promote the progress of all mankind.

Footnotes

1. "Pioneering the Space Frontier. The Report of the National Commission on Space," N.Y., 1986, 211 pages.
2. Ibid., p 145.
3. "Space Science: Past, Present and Future. Hearings..., House of Representatives, 8-10 October 1985," Wash., 1985.
4. See SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1986, No 10, pp 70-73—Ed.
5. FORTUNE, 8 December 1986, pp 42-48.
6. "Pioneering the Space Frontier," p 159.
7. Ibid., p 165.
8. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 26 May 1986.
9. ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS, 1972, No 9, p 6.
10. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 11 June 1979, pp 183, 185.
11. THE WASHINGTON POST, 2 May 1985.
12. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 14 May 1985.

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Review of Czech Book on U.S. Neoconservatism
18030002g Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 10, Oct 87 (signed to press 17 Sep 87) pp 103-105

[Review by I.Ye. Zadorozhnyuk of book "Ideologie a politika neokonservativizmu" by Miloslav Formanek, Prague, Svoboda-Pravda, 1986, 202 pages]

[Text] Life in America in the 1980's has been influenced greatly by the ideological current and political practice of neoconservatism. Many observers and researchers in the

United States believe that the neoconservatives will leave the political stage by the end of the decade. They have left their mark on society, however, and social scientists in many countries have analyzed and are still analyzing this phenomenon in depth.

This kind of analysis is also conducted in the subject of this review, a book published as part of the "Criticism of Bourgeois Ideology and Revisionism" series. Its author is Miloslav Formanek, a research associate at the CSSR Academy of Sciences. The study is distinguished by its current relevance and by a profound theoretical approach to the phenomenon of neoconservatism. The author hoped to reveal and analyze the origins, growth, and possible prospects of neoconservatism as the leading current of bourgeois ideology in the United States today.

What is the essential purpose of neoconservatism and what are its ideals? The author provides this definition: "This is an irrational and essentially antirational ideology which makes no attempts whatsoever to conceal its belligerent hatred for revolution and its counterrevolutionary position. On the contrary, it uses militaristic forms to perpetuate the class-antagonistic bases of society and to maintain the old and transient against the current of social progress" (p 9). The ideology of neoconservatism is "overemotional and fanatical," Formanek writes; its adherents see every protest against the system as an effort to knock down the pillars of civilization and order by "an immoral, godless, and evil" enemy, who is supposedly fighting with unlimited ambition for world domination. Phrases of this kind, Formanek stresses, sound like senseless incantations.

The fears and hopes of the neoconservatives have little basis but are effective means of manipulation. For example, they actively exploit patriotic and religious feelings and convince U.S. citizens of the special mission of their nation. Formanek stresses that although this emotional fervor, fueled by the idea that the United States has been chosen to rule the world, is not characteristic of all neoconservatives, the call for a "crusade" against everything and everyone is always an underlying theme of the conservative ideology. This is the reason for their defense of military force.

The author singles out the following types of neoconservatism: spiritual, which denies everything new for ideological reasons and engenders strong feelings of hostility toward anything new (this type of conservatism, according to bourgeois ideologist C. Rossiter, is allegedly present in every society); traditional, demanding the preservation of old values, and radical, calling for their active reinforcement; legitimist, legitimizing the existing state of affairs, and reformist, demanding vigorous preventive measures to reinforce capitalist values (one of the spokesmen of this variety of neoconservatism, M. Friedman, even calls himself a liberal because he favors changes, but the final goal of these changes is still the preservation of obsolete social structures).

Conservatism must be distinguished from traditionalism, Formanek stresses, because tradition is present in every society. It is also wrong to equate neoconservatism with rightwing radicalism, the extremist forms of political ideology and activity (fascism and rabid racism).

Conservatism in the United States, Formanek writes, is based on a group of well-organized and influential institutions, although these institutions not only cooperate but also engage in extremely insidious forms of struggle against one another. The main centers were established in the 1970's. These are the Committee on the Present Danger, the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, the National Conservative Political Action Committee, the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, and the Moral Majority. The views of the leaders of these organizations, Formanek stresses, are of a clearly anticommunist nature. It would be impossible to disagree with the author's statement that scientific research is not keeping up with the political and ideological activities of all these organizations. He is inclined to justify this, however, with the excuse that "conservatism burst onto the scene with a fury that would have been difficult to anticipate" (p 60).

The ideologists of neoconservatism, Formanek writes, do not even pretend to have a rational understanding of problems. They substitute their belief in the unlimited potential of capitalism and "Sunday-school morality" for this kind of understanding. The accuracy of this statement by the political scientist from the CSSR is indisputable. Fundamentalist preachers and evangelists secure mass support for neoconservative ideas. Their political arguments are backed up by biblical allusions and religious symbols, and they are particularly energetic in assuring the general public that all atheists are immoral. The neoconservatives, Formanek stresses, are distinguished by militarist thinking, with its shows of strength and unchanging globalist ambitions. Furthermore, violence is sometimes preached directly by highly educated and dignified ideologists (for example, I. Kristol), politicians (J. Helms), or members of the administration (Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger).

Opposition to the neoconservative current is starting to take shape, however, in the United States, Formanek notes. This opposition is being joined by the upholders of pacifistic, social-reformist, and Christian traditions. The conservatives are demagogically accusing the organizations opposing militarism of betraying national interests. Catholic bishops, women's organizations active in the antinuclear movement, physicians working toward the prevention of nuclear war, and even the young physicists who left the famous Livermore Laboratory have not escaped these accusations. Voices in support of liberal ideals in the United States have been louder since the middle of the 1980's. Renowned American scientist J. Galbraith said that the conservatives' political mistakes are bringing the time of the liberals' triumph closer. Another ideological reversal has been made by D. Bell and M. Novak.

The author concludes by saying that many prominent neoconservative politicians and public spokesmen are expressing serious doubts about the American political system's potential for self-regulated renewal. They intuitively and pragmatically are seeking the kind of solutions dictated by their instinct for self-preservation (p 189).

But self-preservation in our day, the author writes, entails a search for the bases of the mutually acceptable coexistence of societies with different social orders and different ideological values, and the neoconservatives' intimidating claims to the possession of the "highest truths" and their attempts to impose them on other nations are therefore groundless and futile.

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Chronology of U.S.-Soviet Relations: Jun-Aug 1987

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[Text]

June

1 — The discriminatory measures of the U.S. State Department against members of the mass media of the socialist countries in Washington went into effect.

2 — Secretary A.N. Yakovlev of the CPSU Central Committee received Director C. Wick of the U.S. Information Agency, who was in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

12 — In response to the joint statement of the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev announced that, in order to promote the quickest possible ratification of the Soviet-American agreements of 1974 and 1976 and the considerable reduction, stipulated in these agreements, of the maximum force of nuclear explosions with the simultaneous limitation of their number, the USSR is willing to reach an agreement with the United States on calibrating experiments on one another's testing grounds and to reach an interim agreement with the American side on the limitation of the maximum force of underground nuclear explosions to 1 kiloton and the number of nuclear tests to two or three a year.

15 — Secretary A.F. Dobrynin of the CPSU Central Committee received former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR and renowned American historian G. Kennan at his request.

24 — A report was published on the Geneva meetings of the head of the USSR delegation at the Soviet-American nuclear and space arms talks and USSR First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu.M. Vorontsov with the head of the U.S. delegation and special State Department counsel M. Kampelman and with ambassadors M. Glitman and R. Lehman, members of the U.S. groups on intermediate-range missiles and strategic offensive arms, and the meeting of the head of the USSR delegation with a group of American senators headed by Chairman C. Pell of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

A.F. Dobrynin received President J. Crystal of the Iowa Bankers Trust, a prominent public spokesman and member of the American business community who was in Moscow as the guest of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, at his request.

27 — J. Crystal requested and was granted a meeting with member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee V.P. Nikonov.

July

1 — General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev received former President of the United States J. Carter, who was in Moscow on a short visit, in the Kremlin.

2 — J. Carter was received by A.F. Dobrynin.

Soviet-American consultations on UN matters took place, with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.F. Petrovskiy representing the USSR and U.S. representative to the United Nations with cabinet status V. Walters representing the United States.

3 — The Soviet group on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) at the talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva submitted a draft memorandum on an agreement on the exchange of initial data regarding the drafting of the INF treaty. In connection with the previously submitted Soviet draft protocol on procedures governing the dismantling or destruction of weapons covered by the INF treaty, a joint document on this matter began to be compiled.

4 — The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet sent President R. Reagan of the United States a message of congratulations and its wishes for the peaceful future and prosperity of the American people on the national holiday of the United States of America, Independence Day.

A published Soviet government statement proposed the rapid withdrawal from the Persian Gulf of all naval ships owned by states outside this region and requested Iran and Iraq to refrain from actions constituting a threat to international shipping.

6-7 — Another Soviet-American exchange of views by experts on the situation in the Middle East was held in Geneva.

7-17 — Former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR T. Watson, who had flown the Rye Brook (New York State)-Reykjavik-Helsinki-Moscow-Syktvykar-Novosibirsk-Irkutsk-Yakutsk-Anadyr-Alaska-Washington route to commemorate the 45th anniversary of the delivery of aircraft and military equipment by airlift from the United States to the Soviet Union, met with members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium A.A. Gromyko and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A.N. Yakovlev, and other officials.

13-20 — The latest round of the Soviet-American talks on the cessation of nuclear tests was held in Geneva.

15 — A letter from the members of the American-Soviet "March for Peace" and M.S. Gorbachev's response to the message from the participants in the march, who marched from Leningrad to Novgorod to Kalinin to Moscow between 14 June and 8 July, were published. In his reply, M.S. Gorbachev said that "this joint campaign by Soviet and American citizens, the first such march in the history of USSR-U.S. relations, has made a tangible contribution to stronger trust, mutual understanding, and friendship and is a convincing example of popular diplomacy in action."

21 — At a briefing in the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Soviet and foreign journalists were told the gist of M.S. Gorbachev's response to the recent message from President R. Reagan of the United States in connection with the Iran-Iraq conflict. He noted that the necessary conditions exist for joint action by the USSR and the United States in the UN Security Council to bring the conflict of many years to a speedy and just conclusion.

23 — In response to questions from Indonesia's MERDEKA newspaper, M.S. Gorbachev declared that the Soviet Union would be willing to destroy all of its medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country as well on the condition that the United States do the same. Operational and tactical missiles would also be eliminated. M.S. Gorbachev proposed the limitation of the scales of naval exercises and maneuvers in the Pacific and Indian oceans and adjacent seas.

The USSR delegation at the Soviet-American nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva submitted a new draft resolution on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles for discussion in line with M.S. Gorbachev's statements in his MERDEKA interview.

25 — A statement by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the new and large American radar station near Thule (Greenland) was published and said that as this is a missile warning station, the United States had clearly violated the ABM Treaty by locating it outside its national boundaries.

28 — President R. Reagan of the United States announced that the U.S. delegation at the Soviet-American nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva had been instructed to propose a "double zero" option with regard to medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. As the head of the White House said, the United States is also willing to agree to the elimination of the missiles covered by the future treaty and the prohibition of the conversion of these systems into other types of weapons.

29 — At a plenary meeting of the delegations at the Soviet-American nuclear and space arms talks in Geneva, the USSR delegation submitted a draft "Agreement Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on Some Measures To Strengthen the Framework of the Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems and Prevent an Arms Race in Outer Space," as well as a protocol and common understandings, for discussion.

30 — The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed a U.S. Embassy envoy that the USSR had information that some embassy personnel had established contacts with members of the most extremist groups of Crimean Tatars for purposes warranting the notification of the American side.

August

2 — Underground nuclear explosions with a force of from 20 to 150 kilotons were set off in the USSR on the testing sites near Semipalatinsk and Novaya Zemlya.

5 — Candidate for Membership in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium P.N. Demichev met members of the Soviet-American Volga peace cruise in the Kremlin.

6 — Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze addressed the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and announced that the Soviet Union had removed all possible obstacles to the conclusion of a Soviet-American agreement on the removal of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles from the USSR and U.S. arsenals; the fate of the agreement and the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will depend on the resolution of the issue of the 72 American nuclear warheads on the West German Pershing-1A missiles. "The achievement of a Soviet-American agreement on the complete elimination of two categories of nuclear weapons," the USSR foreign minister said, "is a necessary prologue to the attainment of

the main goal: the elimination of strategic offensive arms and the prevention of an arms race in outer space." E.A. Shevardnadze explained the USSR's goals in the sphere of disarmament and the sequence of actions required to attain these goals.

7 — M.S. Gorbachev had a meeting in the CPSU Central Committee with a group of Russian language instructors from the United States who had been part of an exchange program in Leningrad in line with the agreement on cultural contacts and the program of cooperation and exchanges for 1986-1988.

A.F. Dobrynin received President J. Giffen of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council at his request.

8 — The first issue of a monthly publication containing selected articles in English from PRAVDA was delivered to newspaper stands in American cities.

9 — A district court in Chicago ordered the deportation of Nazi war criminal Liudas Kairis to the Soviet Union.

10 — The All-Union Copyright Agency and the American Abbeville Press, one of the world's largest art publishers, reached an agreement on the publication of a book of photographs, "Russia. 1917," in the United States.

The sixth round of Soviet-American consultations on the prohibition of chemical weapons came to an end in Geneva.

10-31 — The work of all three groups—on medium-range missiles and on space and strategic offensive arms—continued at the Soviet-American nuclear and space arms talks.

13 — The United States conducted another underground nuclear test on the test site in Nevada with a force of from 20 to 150 kilotons.

16 — A TASS report was published in connection with the Western mass media's allegation that the underground nuclear test the Soviet Union conducted on 2 August on Novaya Zemlya island emitted radioactive substances beyond Soviet borders. The report stressed that a thorough investigation proved that the explosion was followed by the emission of a negligible quantity of gaseous products which did not cause radioactive fallout in any other state.

16-23 — A U.S. Senate delegation headed by Senator D. Moynihan made an official visit to the USSR as the guests of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

17-23 — Senate Majority Whip A. Cranston was in Moscow as the guest of the USSR Parliamentary Group. At his request he was received by Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee A.F. Dobrynin and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Besmertnykh.

21 — The U.S. State Department announced that the nuclear test of 13 August 1987 in Nevada had, according to the data of USSR national seismic monitoring services, exceeded the limit of 150 kilotons.

23 — A dangerous incident took place during an Aeroflot flight from Moscow to New York: As the Soviet airliner approached the airport in New York, a U.S. Air Force fighter plane flew past it at high speed at a distance of only 50-100 meters and at the same altitude. After the plane had landed, an Aeroflot spokesman in New York reported the incident to local aviation officials and demanded an investigation. In an oral statement on 25 August, the American side alleged that there was no record of any flying object other than the Aeroflot plane at that altitude at that time. The USSR Embassy issued a vehement protest to the U.S. State Department in connection with this unprecedented and provocative incident.

23-28 — The third conference of American and Soviet public representatives on current issues in American-Soviet relations was held in Chautauqua (New York State).

25 — The traveling exhibit of "The USSR: The Individual, the Family and Society," opened in New Orleans. The exhibit will be shown for approximately a month in five other American cities—Atlanta, Washington, Memphis, Cincinnati, and Kansas City.

26 — A published message from M.S. Gorbachev to the International Conference on the Connection Between Disarmament and Development said, in particular, that an agreement between the USSR and the United States on the complete elimination of two categories of nuclear missiles "could be signed tomorrow if the United States and the FRG would remove the commonly recognized obstacle."

President R. Reagan made a speech in Los Angeles consisting of "the old baggage of anti-Soviet rhetoric," as it was described by a USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman.

The United States submitted a request to the Soviet Union for permission to conduct an inspection in the Belorussian SSR in connection with Soviet troop maneuvers there, which were announced in July to all participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The request was given speedy consideration and was granted on 27 August. On 28 August an American inspection team began an inspection of the region stipulated in the request.

28 — The USSR Embassy in the United States informed the heads of the Leonard Peltier Defense Committee of the Soviet Union's willingness to grant him political asylum. Peltier had made this request at the beginning of August.

31 — Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet G.A. Arbatov, Ye.P. Velikhov, and A.S. Yeliseyev and members of the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat had a meeting in the USSR Supreme Soviet with members of the U.S. House of Representatives T. Downey, R. Carr, A. Battista, and J. Moody and a group of prominent American scientists and experts.

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